Aviation Subcommittee Hearing: “Status of the Boeing 737 MAX”

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you you you you Oh opportunity I'll come to order I want to thank folks who come in this morning we'll get started here the ranking member of the subcommittee and full committee will be here soon enough and I want to thank mr. Mitchell we're seeing in getting started good morning and thank you today to the witnesses for joining the subcommittee's discussion on the status that Boeing 737 max 346 people died in Ethiopia Airlines flight 302 crashed in Addis Ababa Ethiopia and the Lion Air flight 610 crash on route to Jakarta Indonesia Congress has an obligation to the traveling public and the victims of these accidents and their families to ensure the safety of air travel if the public does not feel safe about flying then they won't fly if they don't fly airlines don't need to buy airplanes they don't need to buy airplanes then airplanes don't need to be built and if there's no need to build airplanes we don't need jobs in aviation therefore it is very clear that the foundation of the u.s. aviation system is safety and this committee will continue to maintain safety as its guiding principle and will use the tools at its disposal to reduce the likelihood of tragedies like this from happening again I want to start by updating the subcommittee members in the public and the committee's work to date chair DeFazio and I continue to engage with the FAA the National Transportation Safety Board Boeing pilots aviation stakeholders and others about these accidents first on march 19th chaired apology and I requested that the Department of Transportation inspector general or the dod IG assess the fa s approach to certifying the Boeing 737 max second the committee's oversight and investigations team continues to work with the FAA and Boeing on the records request chair Depaz you and I sent on the certification of the max third the committee sent a separate bipartisan do t IG request to evaluate aircraft cockpit automation and internal international pilot training standards forth following a request from chair to file and I for a third party party review of the certification of Boeing's anticipated 737 max software update and related training the FA established a joint Authority's tech review or JIT R and a tentacle Advisory Board or tab the J a TRS independent review will ensure thorough oversight of the process and rebuild public confidence that the u.s. is the global standard in aviation safety in addition the tab composed the US Air Force the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center and NASA will provide an independent review of the proposed software change and integration into the max flight control system I encourage all members of the subcommittee to personally continue monitoring the situation and staff is available for any questions you might have surrounding the investigation and can provide you with updates as they become available what I hope to hear from witnesses today acting the administer Elwell and Chairman's some wall the subcommittee understands certain information about accidents cannot be publicly discussed at this time because some investigations are ongoing however there is still important information that this subcommittee can learn in today's hearing for instance mr. Elwell I look forward to hearing more about the fa s decision making regarding the certification of the 737 max I want to clarify the ODA process as well as the agency's role in determining risk assessments assigned to key safety features on the aircraft most notably the angle of attack or AOA sensors and the maneuvering characteristics augmentation system or M casts and whether these features should have been designated as safety critical a recent Wall Street Journal article reported an internal FAA review concluded the agency itself failed to perform proper oversight of the certification of the mcat system if that is in fact true the ODA program is not working as Congress intended I also want to hear more about FAS role in the development of associated pilot training for the Macs including opportunities for input from pilots and engagement with Boeing on the related flight manuals additionally I'm interested in the j8 ER and it tabs future processes and how the work of these two groups align with a recently established safety oversight and certification Advisory Committee as mandated under the FA bill we passed last year and finally from you want to hear what steps the FA will take between now and when the 737 max is permitted to fly again administrator Elwell the FAA has a credibility problem the FAA needs to fix its credibility problem this committee will work with the FAA as it rebuilds public and international confidence in its decisions but our job is oversight and the committee will continue to take this role seriously Chairman's son Walt I look forward to learning more about the NTS b–'s of collaboration with foreign investigation authorities and your insights on the preliminary reports for JT 610 and TT 302 accidents Congress must find answers to what happens surrounding these two accidents and ensure the safety of the Boeing 737 max for the sake of the fly in public the FAA must take steps to restore public confidence in the ability to maintain the safest aerospace system in the world today's hearing comes at the beginning of the committee's investigative process and is in the first of what will likely be a series of hearings on the max the committee will continue its thorough investigation until it fully understands all the issues surrounding 737 max accidents and the committee will not hesitate to act to ensure for the to ensure the safety of the u.s. aviation system I'll continue to work with chair DeFazio throughout this process as well subcommittee members the FAA the NTSB Boeing aviation stakeholders and families of victims I want to thank you again to the witnesses they look forward to hearing you address these issues of outline in my statement and now I want to call on the ranking member the acting ranking member of the subcommittee mr. Mitchell for an opening statement he defers to mr. graves the ranking member of the full committee and : rank ranking member graves for his opening statement a lot of graves in her not agrees Thank You chairman Larsen I do want to thank you and and ranking member grace for holding this hearing I want to extend my condolences to the families and friends of the accident victims because it's their losses why it's important that we understand what occurred and what's needed to get the 737 max safely back in the air safety is the highest priority and we have to regularly examine our safety programs and while we are in early stages of this investigation many appear to have already concluded that the FAS process is to blame should the various investigations reveal problems with the certification in 737 max then Congress can and they should act but any actions Congress or regulators consider have to be based on facts and not panic desire just to do something I reviewed the lion air in the ethiopian preliminary accident reports and i feel strongly about sharing my thoughts with this committee based on my experience and perspective as a pilot with an ATP rating first with lion air there were flight control problems reported by the pilots flying the same aircraft on the three days prior to the accident flight on the flight the day before the accident flight the pilots experienced the identical issues yet they flew more than an hour with the autopilot off and trim the plane manually unfortunately it doesn't appear that they fully reported the problems yet based upon those reports the aircraft was serviced and it was cleared for flight the preliminary accident report prepared by Ethiopian authorities concludes that the pilots followed proper procedures but there are civil facts that absolutely contradict that conclusion first the aircraft accelerated throughout the entire flight the pilots never pulled the throttles back after setting them for full thrust at takeoff the aircraft actually accelerated to between 450 to 500 knots which is far beyond the maximum speed certified speed of the max 8 of 340 knots that fundamental error appears to have had a domino effect on the events that followed after that after an apparent an apparent faulty sensor caused the plane's M cast to pitch the plane's nose down the pilots did follow procedures by turning off the automated system and they tried to manually trim the airplane however they were simply going too fast to manually trim that plane if you can imagine driving down the road in a car going 100 miles an hour and trying to push the door open you know what I'm talking about the pilots both in there too with less than a hundred and sixty hours total time combined time in the 737 max they then reactivated the automated system the plane went nose-down again and the pilots were unable to recover that aircraft no operating procedure that I know of or have ever heard of directs a pilot to reactivate a faulty system the line aaron ethiopian pilots desperately tried to save their passengers but the facts in the preliminary report reveal the pilot error as a factor one of the factors there's always many factors in these situations in these tragically fatal accidents to focus on one single cause fails to see the forest for the trees so we're developing an EM cast software fix but we can never eliminate every risk or anticipate all scenarios no matter how much technologies in the cockpit failures will occur that's the reason why I have stated this time and time again that the most important safety feature you can have in any aircraft is a well trained pilot that can fly the aircraft regardless of what the investigations conclude airlines have to ensure that their pilots are sufficiently trained and experienced to handle the aircraft in which they're in pilots can master the cockpits technology but they have to be able to fall back on their training to fly the plane that's first and foremost fly the plane not just fly a computer for me the accident report reaffirms my belief the pilots trained in the United States would have successfully been able to handle this situation the reports compound my concerns about quality training standards in other countries and that's why I've asked the d-o-t Inspector General to look at international pilot training and in the end these facts are irrefutable the US aviation system is the world's safest thanks to our FAA leadership and despite sensational reports claiming that the agency's international standing is in question our FAA remains the gold standard for safety in the United States in the last decade in the United States there have been nearly seven billion passenger flown on 90 million flights with one fatality and this includes 57,000 flights in the max eight 737 max a while one loss of life is too many that is a remarkable safety record that we can be proud of here in the US and one reason our system is safe is the collaborative process between the FAA pilots manufacturers Airlines mechanics everybody up and down the line this decades-old system or structure has worked so well the last Congress we overwhelmingly voted to uphold and improve the agency's aircraft certification process and I caution those who want to blame if a process that jumping to conclusions only serves to erode confidence in the u.s. aviation system when the safety record absolutely speaks for itself we have preliminary information we do not have the final reports nor the benefit of the investigative work that is yet to be completed but what we do know does not justify abandoning the FAA is proven system that has made air travel here in the United States the safest mode of transportation in history and again I want to thank you all for holding this hearing and on you bet thank you for some graves recognize chair DeFazio Thank You mr. chairman you know I don't want anyone to think that we're gonna walk out of here today with all the answers we aren't we're very much in the beginning of our investigation the FAA has only begun to turn over documents which we requested a couple months ago but the secretary assures me they will be fully cooperative on the other hand a boeing has yet to provide a single document I'm hoping they will provide the documents we've requested voluntarily and in the not-too-distant future this is a very complex issue and it has raised questions that do a worldwide question the FAA and its certification process and we've got two get to the bottom of this first I want to recognize the parents were here today of 24 year old samya Stu mo and I I'm sorry for your loss it shouldn't have happened so they they deserve answers and accountability as does the flying public in the United States and worldwide that subcommittee chairmen went through the investigations we've begun and asked for those are ongoing I've been on the committee a long time it was only after the valujet tragedy this committee had rejected my amendment to strip the FAA of an ancient promotional Authority left over from the time of the beginnings of flight and I had been defeated in committee it wasn't in the Senate bill but strangely enough I was pre jr. remember I get a phone call saying where would we put your provision in the bill I said what's not conference' below it was rejected in my committee it's not in the Senate bill those days we followed the rules we don't anymore I was surprised but they put it in the bill and we took away ostensibly the promotional Authority and then for years I questioned the number of hours of required to sit in the second seat in the cockpit I pointed out that it took three times as many hours to be a hairdresser in the state of Oregon as to be copilot in a commercial aircraft it was only after Colgan that we changed the rules you know we shouldn't have to have tragedies to change the rules if the rules need to be changed and now we have another tragedy now the question is what were the factors now I find it you know the the ranking member said a number of things I could agree with about training in that but I got a question why until the plane went down the first plane Lyon air it wasn't even in the manual that automated system existed wasn't in the manual now that's odd because the pilots were the redundancy how the hell are you the redundancy if you don't know something there's something called a startle factor yeah I'm not a commercial pilot but I gotta tell you if you're at a low altitude and suddenly the plane starts automatically pitching itself down every 10 seconds there's gonna be a lot of people who are gonna have trouble dealing with that and you know so why wasn't it known and and in fact also the disagree light issue the disagree light was disabled unless you bought an optional package we now hear oh that was an accident software problem we weren't trying but people thought the disagree light was there they didn't know it wasn't operable and Boeing due for more than a year before that crash that the disagree light didn't work unless you bought their optional package which lion air didn't and a whole heck of a lot of other people didn't buy how did that get certified how can we have a single point of failure on a modern aircraft single point of failure one faulty sensor one sensor sheared off by a bird whatever happened in Ethiopia one faulty sensor installed improperly whatever happens in Indonesia how can you have a system critical safety system certified those are the questions we've got to answer as we go through this process there's I've got a whole list that thinks here I'm not going to go through them because I want to get to the witnesses but I gotta say this is you know we shouldn't have to be here today and you know with that I'm gonna yield back the balance of my time thank you turn DeFazio I recognize ranking member of the subcommittee represent of graves Thank You mr. chairman and I want to thank you for holding this hearing today this is about people and I don't think any of us need to lose sight of that and I want to express my sympathy for your loss and for the loss of all of the victims of these tragic crashes I'm going to say it again this is about people this isn't about politics it's not about emotion this is about people and we need to take every single lesson we can extract from these accidents and make sure that we learn from them and make sure that we apply them to to future flights because while their travel today is the safest form of transportation it doesn't mean we should at all rest on our laurels and say we're good we need to continue learning we need to figure out every mistake error that was made in this case and make sure that it doesn't it doesn't happen again as we know the the 737 max has been grounded since since March 13th following the the second international incident in five months the line air and the Ethiopian air accidents while the accident investigations into both crashes continue and and we need to make sure we understand all the factors that contribute to the accidents it is clear that the maneuvering characteristics augmentation system or end cast does appear to be a factor in both in both accidents boeing has announced that they are working on a on a software fix and we await its submission the FAA for for certification there multiple investigations underway by the Department of Transportation by the inspector general and others and as those investigations continue it's important that we set the record straight it's important that we as I said learn and that we make air travel even safer it's been very concerning watching folks in many cases being pseudo experts look it takes thousands of hours to even get to the flight deck of a plane in the United States and and look let's be honest with the exception of Sam the ranking member of the full committee not many of us have an extraordinary amount of experience in in flying planes this is a technical issue there is a lot that goes on behind the scenes and and very very technical process we need to be very careful to make sure that we're not acting on emotion that we're not making this political they were operating on facts and we're truly taking steps that are going to improve aviation safety to make sure that every single lesson can be extracted and applied no-one gets applause when a plan leaves land safely after an uneventful flight the baseline for commercial safety for commercial aviation is zero zero fatalities and zero accidents it took a long time to reach that level of safety and sadly many of our safety gains followed tragic accidents any deviation from our current baseline means that we have to look at how the accident occurred and how to prevent in the future but I want to be clear the changes in their forms that we make and the in the wake of these accidents must be based upon fact and must preserve the effing essence of the aviation system that has led to this unprecedented level of safety right here in the United States aviation accidents of the result of series of events there's not just one cause often as we all know the two accidents that we're discussing today did appear to have multiple factors that were included we're going to wait for that final conclusion to ultimately take ultimately determine what exactly contributed but we believe that there are multiple steps or review in the FAA certification process it's also important that we look at those other factors including the operations the maintenance programs the pilot experience requirements the pilot training programs of the air carriers involved and how those factors may have also applied or infected the the outcome we need to understand the whole system and whether the checks and balances redundancies that are needed in any airline safety program are present and adhere to in these accidents in these disasters today is not an investigative hearing or a long way from the final accident reports in the completed investigations we're here today to learn more about the nation's response these accidents and what the next steps are before the 737 max possibly returns to service I want to commend FAA Acting Administrator DN Elwell for your leadership and for your accessibility well we await the Senate's confirmation of the FAA Administrator I do know the FAA is in good hands I want to hear more from the witnesses about the various reviews and accident investigations including their face Technical Advisory Board in Georgia Thor T's Technical Review but I also want to be clear no matter what other countries say I've not seen anything that questions my confidence in FAA s safety judgment to date and and I continue to plan to work with you on a daily basis to ensure we understand all the facts thanks again mr. chairman and yield back the balance Thank You mr. graves and I'm going to move to questions and I want to welcome our witnesses I I know I have you seated Elwell to some Walt but I actually wanted a some walty elbow in terms of order to get to let chair some well discuss a little bit about the investigations as they sit today but I want to welcome our witnesses mr. Dannon Elwell Acting Administrator Federal Aviation Administration he's accompanied by Earl Lawrence executive director of aircraft certification of the FAA and I understand mr. Lawrence is here for technical support is available to answer questions but Michelle will be given the testimony and then mr. Sun waltz chair of the National Transportation Safety Board and he's accompanied by his Danish Schultz acting director office of aviation safety of the NTSB as well chair someone will give the testimony for NTSB and director Schultz is available to help with any technical questions without objection our witnesses full statements will be included the record since your written testimony has been made part of the record the subcommittee does request you limit your oral testimony to five minutes and share someone we recognized now for five minutes thank you thank you and good morning chairman Larson ranking member graves chairman DeFazio and ranking member graves members of the subcommittee sheer right into that microphone thank you for allowing the NTSB to testify before you this morning as you mentioned accompanying me this morning is miss Dana Schulz who is the acting director of the NTS b–'s office of aviation safety as you are well aware during a recent five-month period there have been two crashes involving the seven 37 Maks tragically these two crashes have claimed 346 lives and I say this next statement with all sincerity it's not a cliche but our thoughts and prayers go to the families of those victims now unlike the NTSB is involvement in domestic aviation accidents where we have a statutory responsibility to investigate every civil aviation accident that occurs within the u.s. our involvement with international investigations is vastly different the NTSB is role an accident investigation in accidents that occur outside of the United States is governed by annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation to which 193 countries including the US are signatories annex 13 states that a safety investigation be led in the country in which the accident occurs known as the state of occurrence thus the k and k t of indonesia is leading the investigation into last year's lyon air crashed and likewise the Ethiopian Accident Investigation Bureau is leading the investigation into the into the Ethiopian Airlines crash when the US when the accident involves a u.s. operated or registered aircraft or us designed or manufactured aircraft as these aircraft were the NTSB appoints an accredited representative this is a highly skilled NTSB investigator whose purpose is to coordinate the input of all US interests including NTSB FAA and US companies such as the manufacturers and others that can provide technical expertise it's important to note that the state of occurrence leads the investigation and controls the release of public information from that accident investigation not the NTSB now that said NTSB participation in foreign accident investigations enables access to investigative data and information needed by the FAA the manufacturer or the operator to address safety deficiencies as well as by the NTSB so we can issue safety recommendations when necessary we work closely with the involved accident investigation authorities to ensure that we received the information we need to sufficiently address safety deficiencies following last year's Lian air crash we immediately dispatched investigators to Indonesia to participate in the Indonesian government's investigation an NTSB investigator was stationed onboard one of the search vessels to help identify recovered aircraft components and once the cockpit voice recorder was recovered in January we recalled for investigators who were furloughed during the partial government shutdown their role was to assist with the recorder download and analysis we responded immediately to the Ethiopian Airlines crash by sending a team of investigators to Ethiopia and once the recorders were sent to our aviation counterparts in France the B ei we dispatched investigators to France to assist with the recorder download and read out within 30 days of each crash the Indonesian and Ethiopian authorities issued a preliminary report regarding their respective investigations NTSB provided technical comments for each of these reports last week miss Shults travel to Addis to meet with Ethiopian officials regarding the investigation and in the coming weeks the US team will return to Ethiopia to work further with those authorities because the u.s. is the state of design and certification of the 737 we are also examining the design certification process is a part of our participation in these foreign lead investigations our review is continuing and if we uncover safety deficiencies we are prepared to quickly issue safety recommendations aimed at correcting such deficiencies our commitment to the traveling public and especially to those families affected by these two tragic events is to bring all of our experience and expertise in support of the international effort to determine why these accidents occurred and most importantly to ensure that no similar accident like these occurs again thank you we'll be happy to answer your questions Thank You mr. chair Sam will now recognize acting Minister dan Elwell for five minutes chairman Larson ranking member graves chairman DeFazio ranking member graves thank you for the opportunity today to discuss aviation safety and the issues surrounding the Boeing 737 max I also want to take this opportunity to express my sincerest condolences on behalf of the entire FAA to the victims and their families of both Ethiopia flight 302 and Lion Air flight 610 I want to emphasize at the outset that the FAA welcomes scrutiny that helps make us better that is how our global leadership and aviation safety will endure as you all know the FAA grounded the u.s. 737 max fleet on March 13 2019 that decision was based upon crash site findings and satellite data that together indicated some similarities between the Ethiopian and Indonesian accidents that warranted further investigation of the possibility of a shared cause and I will focus my remarks today on events since the grounding in particular the various ongoing reviews of the FAS processes and the work being done towards safely returning the 737 max to service our commitment to safety and fact-based data-driven decision-making has been the guiding principle in all of this after the grounding several reviews were initiated to assess the fa a–'s processes separate from evaluating any particular technical fix for the 737 max on march 19th secretary Chao asked the Department of Transportation's inspector general to conduct an audit of this Boeing 737 max a certification with the goal specifically to compile an objective and detailed history of the activities that led to certification that out audit is ongoing with the cooperation of the FAA secretary Chow on March 25th announced the establishment of a special committee to review the FAA s procedures for the certification of new aircraft including the Boeing 737 max the special committee is an independent body whose findings and recommendations will be presented directly to the secretary and the FAA Administrator on April 2nd the FAA launched a joint Authority's technical review chatter to review the certification of the 737 max automated flight control system the Tjader is chaired by former NTSB chairman Christopher Hart and comprises a team of us experts and international aviation authorities the 737 max returned to service is not contingent on these reviews rather the reviews are geared towards developing systemic improvements for the future now talk about the FAA s efforts to safely return the 737 max to service here and abroad as the FAA discussed in an informational notice for 737 max operators on March 20th boeing has been working on a service bulletins that would specify the installation of new flight control computer operational program software and has developed flight crew training related to this software on April 12th the FAA met with safety representatives of the three us-based commercial airlines that fly the Boeing 737 max as well as the pilot unions for those airlines and this unprecedented meeting was an opportunity for the FAA to hear individual views from operators and pilots the FAA recently solicited public comment on a draft report prepared by the FAA s Boeing 737 max Flight standardization board that board consists of pilots and we use it to evaluate Boeing's proposed associated with Boeing's proposed software enhancements for the 737 max on may 6th we initiated a multi-agency technical advisory board or tab to review Boeing's MKS software update and system safety assessment the tab includes experts from the US Air Force NASA Volpe and the FAA and none of these experts were involved in the original certification of the 737 max the tabs recommendations will directly inform our decisions on the 737 max fleets return to service and next week on May 23rd the FAA will host a meeting of directors general of civil aviation authorities from around the world to discuss the FAA s activities toward ensuring the safe return of the 737 max to service this meeting is part of the FAA s efforts to work with other civil aviation authorities to address specific concerns related to the 737 max in keeping with the FAA zong standing cooperation with our international partners as our work continues I want to offer this assurance in the u.s. the 737 max will return to service only when the FAA is analysis of the facts and technical data indicate that it's safe to do so this concludes my prepared statement welcome your questions thank you very much for your statements both of you we're now going to move to member questions each member will be recognized for five minutes and I'll start by recognizing myself administrator Elwell this week Wall Street Journal reported to FA and FA internal review tentatively determined senior agency officials did not participate in or monitor critical safety assessments of the 737 max flight control system also noted the fa deferred to boyens early safety classification and the subsequent analysis of potential hazards performed with limited oversight by the agency is that report accurate and if accurate what explanation is that if they have for I guess falling down on the job microphone thank you for that question chairman Larsen I think you're talking about The Wall Street Journal article of yesterday and I we take all those those articles and those charges or reports seriously but frankly I there's nothing in that article that led me to anything that I'm aware of so so we'll we'll certainly see what we can find out about it but and and I'll ask my colleague Earl if he if he's aware of before you get to mr. Lawrence so the article reported that the FA s own assessment determined tentatively that senior agency officials were not involved in this assessment I'm not aware of an internal assessment Florence reached that conclusion we're I'm not aware of the internal assessment that the article refers to I was okay well we have some homework and you do too I think it does relate to set of questions with regards the ODA and the use of the the Oda process mr. Elwell you previously stated that was reported that you stated that a full reversion of certification activities to the FAA would require 10,000 additional FAA inspectors and 1.8 billion dollars I'm not here to argue whether it's one more one less than that but has the FA considered moving back to the previous designated engineering representative system away from the AR system and what would that cost me chairman Larsen I don't know what that cost would be I know that there are a number of investigations and audits as we as several opening statements have have pointed out that are designed to look at the process I also know that our risk-based data driven systems approach has as a ranking member grave stated as lead four to the u.s. safest system in history in the world I am very very careful to make sure that the results of any inquiries investigations audits bring us actionable information I mean as as I said we welcome those investigations we welcome the audits they make us better but at this point to say that we're willing to go back to something before we've gone through those investigations I'm not prepared to say that I I really want to see what these investigations and these audits have to say about our processes so the current system with authorized representatives however has Oda participants reporting I understand to managers as opposed to engineers and under the de our system the Oda designee is for reporting to engineers are you through your assessment looking at whether a change from reporting to engineers who can who can monitor engineers versus managers who are looking more at budgets are you looking at whether that process needs to be changed is that gonna be part of they say the the blue-ribbon Commission's look sir I'm not aware of any limit on what we're gonna look at we're gonna look at everything I would say that the organization designation Authority Oda as it exists today is a process that's developed over decades we've had Oda in one form of another since the beginning of the FAA we've had delegation of authority since 1927 it's the concept isn't new it's the administration of it in my mind if we have robust over I and we have all the protections in place to guard against conflicts of interest or undue pressure which I believe we currently have it's a good system but it can always be made better and that's that's what we're all about and I'll just conclude but on that point though that I guess put putting the faith in the evolution of the system to get to where we are today isn't necessarily a positive assessment of the system that we have just because it has evolved since 1927 doesn't mean it has evolved to the place where it needs to be or should be and it perhaps has over evolved in this case if you will so with that I'll yield 5 minutes to ranking member and graves of Louisiana Thank You mr. chairman raise your hand if you have a pilot's license in this room raise your hand if you have been flying a plane when the stick shakers gone off the stick shakers gone off so wait could you do that again hands up stick shakers gone off three of you for you and and and did any of you not turn the plane around or come back and land when that happened raise your hand if you kept going Thank You mr. mr. mr. chairman I I just want to make note that no one raised their hand in terms of continuing the flight and the reason I ask that question is that is that in both accidents stick shakers went off and and and and the planes didn't turn around and I just I find that interesting that I find that interesting that that the that in this case the planes didn't turn around mr. Elwell there's been a lot of confusing information in the news media regarding what happened and and I've read a few times where the there has been referenced to quote self-certification could you clarify that do companies self-certify they're their own aircraft mr. graves no sir they don't we don't have a program of self-certification Oda empowers private individuals at a company that has an Oda program to do certain tasks and make certain decisions they are delegated with that authority that we then oversee and this isn't something that we give lightly to to be granted an Oda is a privilege that a company earns we have about 79 or 80 of them I think and it's important to note that the vetting that is required of the individuals in an Oda program and the Oda program itself is very thorough and robust and to your point mr. chairman we're not resting on that we don't we don't ever stay static on anything in the FAA safety-related so we'll continue to look at that and I I have to my right mr. Lawrence who is our resident expert on on Oda and the process if if I can allow him to elaborate thank you I'd like to build one point under mr. Elwell's comments and it goes back to the chairman Larson's coming earlier in in an Oda system we don't have engineers reporting to just managers we have engineers reporting to engineers and those engineers are all have to be approved and vetted by the FAA so the head of an Oda is an engineer who has all those skills and experiences that has to be approved by FAA engineers as well thank you mister have another question again a lot of a lot of interesting articles regarding the the potential ungrounded the of the max could you describe the steps that that that the plane would have to go through in order to be ungrounded or to be able to fly again yes sir so I think just to go back a little bit it's important to to lay the groundwork for it we we grounded the u.s. fleet when we had the data to establish a potential causal link between two accidents that is the justification for grounding and it's important that you establish a link because you then have what you need to mitigate to unground or to remove the prohibition order so what we will do is we will receive Boeing's application for a design modification to the MKS system and we will thoroughly evaluate that and their system safety analysis we will evaluate the training required to bring that to certify that new software system and once we have made our analysis we've consulted with the tab which by the way is a third party third set of eyes that I think this committee recommended a month or two ago that that should be employed in this instance and we agree and we initiated the tab and once we have absolutely convinced of the safety of return to service and we'll do it germán some well very quick yes or no do you believe that there are processes programs or procedures that domestic airlines follow that may have prevented these based on your preliminary preventive these accidents based on your preliminary reports ranking member graves I apologize maybe it's my ears maybe it's the acoustics in the room I'm not having I'm having difficulty hearing the question left I'd love to come back to it but we will we will I recognize chair DeFazio for five minutes thank mr. chairman administrator Elwell we were both near force you were pilot I wasn't but my understanding is that the air force has a minimum of two angle-of-attack sensors on its planes and sometimes as many as four is that sound right to you sorry there are different numbers depending on on the size of the aircraft but never one as far as I know never one right the planes I flew in the Air Force had least two okay then the is the MKS a safety critical system in your opinion I didn't make that designation but it seems to me that yes it is okay then why would it trigger with a single point of failure I mean isn't that kind of standard that we never have a safety critical system trigger off a single point of failure yes sir a single point of failure means that if that component or that part of the aircraft fails it will lead to an accident well the cases in this case it led to triggering the M cast which is safety critical here let me let me read you something this I got this from a very very experienced 737 pilot if AM cast has not stopped by the pilots in in the at the completion of two full M cast cycles ten seconds pause five seconds ten seconds horizontal stabilizer is at or very close to the full nose-down limit of travel at this point the pilots do not have enough elevator authority to overcome the horizontal stabilizer and the nose the aircraft will continue to fall the aircraft is no longer controllable and pitch the only possible recovery is trim the aircraft nose up so the horizontal stabilizer moves to a flyable position this pilot would characterize an M cast runaway as having high potential to result in a drastic abrupt maneuver that sounds pretty radical I mean now why in this case the argument is the pilots are supposed to correct the system but until after lion air the pilots didn't know the system was installed was that correct yes sir and the pilots also didn't know that the disagree light didn't work unless you bought the optional package of safety which included more and another said you had both the disagree light and then you had I guess digital gauges that showed what the angle Tagg sensors were word seeing or feeling or doing so when did the FAA become aware that the disagree light wasn't working which had been on I guess all previous models of the 737 sir if I could go back to the 737 pilot yeah so I wasn't a 737 pilot in my commercial days but I had the opportunity to fly the Macs in a month or so ago and I would I would offer on the mechanics of it that at the moment that a pilot and were trained our entire careers the moment you feel the airplane doing something you didn't command it to do you instinctively trim in the other direction and if it doesn't work you do a memory procedure called run away stabbed room so they I'm not going to take issue with his comments about two bursts of yem cast what it might do but I know I so that's that's that's a that's a elapse time period of 20 seconds yeah I I it's 20 seconds yeah I mean that's pretty quick and if you're at a low altitude I think it's you know pretty but let's go back to the issue of when the FAA was informed by Boeing Boeing knew that I believe about a year before they informed the FAA that the disagree light didn't work so sir are we've looked at this and software engineers discovered the anomaly and the anomaly was tied to the EM cast software that part of the change of the end but but the question or just no I I get that I mean we can get into details but the point is a year elapsed before Boeing told the FAA what actions did the FAA take at that point in time did you consider that inappropriate behavior by Boeing so I'm concerned that it took a year and we're looking into that and we're going to fix that once we learned that the light was not operable then we made the decision that it is not a safety-critical display it's not a safety-critical display it is advisory there are no actions that the pilot takes to an AO a disagree light and so it did not Olive would would alert them to that that whatever the runaway problem is due to is due to at that point the angle of attack indicators actually the the notice of that is tactile one yoke is shaking and the other isn't that is by definition right away disagree so the light is advisory okay then why is it there at all it's good for maintenance so if you get an AoE disagree light in flight you know to tell maintenance on the ground hey check one of these is not calibrated correctly or is good so then really you don't think it's significant that Boeing didn't tell people the system was in the plane and didn't tell people that the disagree light didn't work none of that was oh actually probably Matt I think that's an issue certain we're gonna look into it it shouldn't take a year for us to find out that that discovery was made I appreciate that and I really would want to know the answer and in fact there the Dallas news and this is off of a tape recording so I think it's accurate this was pilots talking to after they found out that there was an EM caste system in the plane after lion air talking to a Boeing engineer and they said why wouldn't you tell us about the system I don't know that understanding this system would have changed the outcome he said in a million miles you're gonna maybe fly this airplane maybe you're once gonna see this ever we try not to overload the crews with information that's unnecessary I mean do we really think that the that was unnecessary that that it wasn't even in the manual and they didn't know about it I mean there's a lot of stuff in that manual that you don't really need to know yeah well mr. chairman I can't comment on that conversation and I think you were quoting Boeing I as a pilot when when I first heard about this I thought that there should have been more text in the manual about EMS I agree mr. Lawrence in response to the Chairman you said that the engineer reports to an engineer can that engineer to which the report is rendered be also be a manager at Boeing they would be a manager in our in the organizational delegation organization could they be have managerial status at Boeing and they're paid by Boeing is that correct they are paid by Boeing that is correct okay thank you just one other question now we've had 14 if we could put up on the screen the the flight deck 67 flight deck 17 well I thought we can put it up in anyway I have it here you can't see it but you'd be familiar where they we're getting used to our new electronics but when you think of it there it is now pretty different airplanes there you know their computer screens GPS everything's digital you know the others analog you know very very different planes and this is 14 variations later and I think we've got a question the system where if you I think if you took the 737 100 and compared it to a max you would say wow these are different types but we sort of gradually got there kept moving and moving and moving through 14 variations and never determined that it would have to go through a more rigorous process as a new type and including pilot retraining and those sorts of things I mean doesn't that raise some questions about how you kind of get this creep over 14 variations over over many years that is 67 42 years sorry I know that begs the question I would remind though that the amended type certificate of the max was amending the ng and if you had the ng in the Mac side by side then you could see the similarities there so close as to as to be amended wasn't the ng amended from the 900 correct was amended from the eight seven six out of one so I mean that's kind of a it's kind of a creep it seems to me yeah I think there's a question there that we should look at well and and as I said before that in the beginning of your questions we welcome that that examination if if there's something wrong with the extension of a family and of course that's something that that the 737 has multiple iterations but again we're certifying to the last to the last one okay all right with that Thank You mr. chairman thank you I know we have a five-minute roll them indulge a chair I have a eight and a half minutes and I want to afford that for the ranking member committee as well so recognize mr. graves the ranking member for update enough minutes Thank You mr. chairman we bring that back up the on the screen we keep we keep focusing on the angle of attack indicator so if you see on the right there 737 max that that screen in front of both the pilot and the co-pilot with the blue above and the brown below that's your primary angle of attack indicator that's your artificial horizon every aircraft out there has to have that to be certified the one on the left the older version that's digital on the right the one on the left is what we call analog and if you see the circle in front of both the pilot and the co-pilot and there's white above and black below it's the same thing that's your artificial horizon that's your primary angle of attack indicate in fact all my years of flying I don't think I've ever had an actual what we're talking about angle of attack indicator in any of the aircraft I've ever flown but what's interesting too is and we we fail to and I go back to this you got to know how to fly the plane fly the plane in Ethiopia Airlines incident you can look outside that's the critical angle of attack indication right there look outside the airplane when you find it you can tell if you're at a critical angle of attack because you're gonna be pitched up you're gonna be you're getting close to a stall situation those are your two main angle of attack indicators first of all look outside when you're flying the plane and second of all look at your your artificial horizon and I guess my first question is for administrator all well and at this point we know we always know there's so many other things to look at in in these investigations you know not just if a certification activities with the 737 max but many many other things and what I want to get to is the preliminary report shows that there were a lot of misidentifications on what was occurring in the aircraft and misapplications of safety procedures and and training in itself and is a pilot and I want you to talk to us as a pilot can you provide this some context as to what actions or inactions by the pilots or the airline for that manner also requires some close examination in the course of this in this investigation yes sir thank you for that question as a pilot I mentioned a little bit earlier that in the u.s. training focuses on hand flying manual flying there are other parts of the world and other countries that focus on flight control management but in the u.s. from the first training you do as a pilot air force for me but it's the same in civil it's flying the aircraft and what was going on it's already been pointed out that there was an a false indication of a stall immediately recognizable to the trained pilot as a false indication because one yoke was shaking the other wasn't what concerns me about the the data from the flight data recorder is the apparent lack of recognition of runaway stab trim runaway stab trim is taught at the earliest stages of aircraft that have stab trim motors and it is so important to chairman DeFazio s point about time elapse time it's so important that you don't pull out a checklist you don't open and look at what next it's memorized and you're tested on it all the time and you turn off those stab trim motors in the lion air accident it's significant that even though the airplane was pitching against the pilots commands that's classic runaway stab trim the stab trim motors in 13 minutes were never turned off and I think you made the point sir in your remarks that in the case of the ethiopian air flight they did turn them off although they didn't adhere to the emergency ad that we put out on november 8th they did turn the stab trims off but they never controlled their airspeed and then subsequently about a minute out before the end of the flight they turned them back on both of those things are unfortunate obviously and I have to point out in deference to my colleague here to my left chairman some well these investigations are ongoing and as you said there are so many pieces to any accident I've never looked at an accident where there weren't three or four or five links of the chain any one of which if it hadn't gone wrong the plane would have survived so we know that there's going to be and there are factors but as a pilot as you asked me that's that's what I saw the lack of control and the speed on an Ethiopian and the the inability the apparent not doing the stab trim cutout switch procedure we come back to and we keep coming back to it and forgetting you know once they set those throttles to full power they never retard him and I've used that analogy the analogy before when you're in a car and you're speeding towards a brick wall full speed you're gonna take your foot off the gas that's what most people would do but they accelerated right through their certified maximum speed of a of the max eight and just kept on accelerating throughout the entire process that aircraft kept accelerating and when you get those kind of pressures against the control surfaces it makes it very very hard to to do manually and you know and again this comes back to so many times pilot training this is what worries me more than anything else and and I hate to disparage you know another country and and and what their pilot training is but that's what scares me in all of this is climbing on an aircraft or an airline you know that is there's outside US jurisdiction I know what we have in the US and I know we're capable of and I know the quality of our pilots and the quality what they have to go through to get to that point and and I just think it's you know it just bothers me here we are we just we continue to tear down our system based on you know what has happened in in in another country to other countries and particularly given the qualifications and you know what we're learning about the training standards but that last part was port head tutorial than anything else mr. chairman I yield back Thank You ranking graves now recognized rep represent Norton for five minutes Thank You mr. chairman we don't tear down our system we want to restore confidence in our system Monsieur and I'm sure you are concerned that this is impressive record may well be shattered I regarded as a purpose of this hearing as your answers to help us if we can restore confidence in a system and by the way most members maybe except me use every single every single week to go back and forth to the Congress so that this loss of confidence this despite this wonderful 10-year record seems to have been shattered and so just let me ask you a question preliminary mr. well I think most members of the public after one crash would have said oh that's unusual what are the two crashes why did it take so long compared to other countries that made the decision almost immediately after the Ethiopian Airlines accident in fact because I recall it the president made the announcement but as is what he probably was perhaps pre-empting the FAA but that's where the announcement came from if anything it signals the importance that somebody should speak up so I I think a public which will be interested in this hearing wants to know why did it take you so long after the Ethiopian Airlines accident explained that to this committee mrs. Norton thank you for that question the FAA is a data-driven risk-based systems approach to all things safety when we take an action and whether it's the grounding of an aircraft or an air worthiness directive or all the countries weren't data driven that's a difference between you and other countries I can't speak to the decision making of other countries I can tell you this a number of countries that that grounded their 737 max fleets called us immediately after and asked what data we had several countries asked after grounding their fleets what are we going to eat that that means that they were looking at real time real life evidence even if it may have contradicted the data are you still as reliant on data as you were then compared to other countries today would you be reliant only on data well ma'am that's a great question we made our decision to ground the aircraft when we had the data that linked the two flights data to length of flights but we weren't just sitting waiting for the cockpit voice recorder or the flight data recorder we were examining as the regulator of our 737 max sleep what's going on with our fleet and we drew data on 57,000 flights and we were talking constantly with our neighbor neighbor to the north it was after the first after after from the first accident but up through Ethiopia to find out are we the the the fleet that I am responsible for regulating are they experiencing any anomalies and there were zero zero and fifty-seven thousand flights can I ask you this mr. I'm sorry could I ask you this then okay again we see reliance and I would say perhaps over reliance on data did the president make this call or did the FAA make this call a phase safety regulator FAA made the call too and he only made the announcement is that what you saying you were prepared to make that call yourself after the second accident yes ma'am okay he preempted you but you were prepared to do it you wouldn't have waited for a third accident the data told you after the second accidents ma'am yes ma'am could I ask you or mr. L does the FAA mandate power training on all of its systems and which and this was news to me in which the pilot is considered the redundancy for the systems failure most of us didn't know that the pilot was so considered mr. Hall you have to take that question for the record I'm sorry sir you'll have to take the question for the record okay and recognize mr. Mitchell were sir Mitchell for five minutes Thank You mr. chair the effectiveness the success of the aviation system in North America has been based on safety reliability and transparency of decision-making both in terms of certification of aircraft pilot qualifications and when there are incidents mr. well you really call last week there was a briefing from members of the committee on the 737 max certification I asked a question I asked what this is what the FAA had done in the process of reviewing and certifying the EM cast system to be honest with you sir I got a hold of scripts what the system didn't didn't do but didn't get an answer to my question no point did I and they were greeted by as mr. Fazio notes this Wall Street Journal article so I'll ask the question again I'll ask it for the record and I will ask you submit in writing to the committee what were the steps the FAA took in reviewing the MKS system and the accompanying training because I've asked it now three times and I've blown with you sir with all due respect I haven't gotten a direct answer and the community deserves it we will get that answer for you sir I hope you deeply appreciate it and I'd like it straight up what did you what was the engagement in the system throughout the process in detail don't worry about boring me I don't believe that the chair is gonna be bored by reading this I certainly am NOT we need to understand that because there's a critical component of this yeah I can write I can assure you that the MKS system was examined and certified because it was a new system to the max it was and we retained it and we we had the oversight of that and we certified it well you may recall I asked the question didn't get an answer that dough is they were close to satisfactory I'd appreciated let's transition to as is noted 737 max is flown 57,000 flights in North America without an incident part of the difference is the training of the aviators deflect pilots I mean I've done some structure I don't have a pilot's license I don't have time but there's clearly made to me these first thing you a v8 you fly the plane they need navigate then you communicate so yeah I see mr. Shekar they made me do it it's interesting I'm concerned that and I'm trying to be respectful because they're deceased the pilot commanded the Ethiopian air was 29 years old and was reported to have 80 100 and change hours of flight now let me give you some examples close friends of mine are commercial pilots flew for major corporations he's 58 at 17,000 hours the gentleman is 63 also flew from major corporations in private flight six is 63 years old is 20,000 hours the second first officer had 361 hours have you I mean do we not have concerns with not only the training of pilots in other nations but the reliability of their logs to try and claim 80-100 hours at age 29 how many pilots do you know have twin and have have over 8,000 hours of 29u servation mr. Mitchell I don't I don't know anybody 29 years old that has 80 100 hours but I'm not gonna say that that's not possible and the answer to your question is do we want to examine and take a very hard look at the training standards globally yes absolutely we've been involved the US has led on pilot training for many years and we do that at the International Civil Aviation Organization the UN body that provides the guidance for standards around the world I think it needs to be an issue that we address with ICAO and as we deal with this because clearly with the disparity is concerning to me one quick question I guess I would also ask you to assert this is a record whose time is gonna run short in reference to my colleagues question part of the reason for the delay or the delayed response the United States is we got our data from Canada do we not indirectly yes sir we didn't have the data the same level of specificity that Canada had because we don't have access to that system they use for air traffic control correct we we do have access to it sir but Canada got it first because it came from a company that the air traffic services in Canada I submit that whole process that whole time I've been writing to the committee please yes sir well thank you sir one last comment I believe that we've got the most advanced aviation system world to find multiple factors that contribute to this terrible tragedy one of which will be we didn't see things that could have come up it's hard to sometimes have a crystal ball but when you do recertify this aircraft I will be among the first to buy a ticket to find the plane because I have faith in ER aviation system I have faith in the FAA I have faith in Boeing in the aircraft they fly a buy one I'll fly it somewhere to make the point that we have to starvation system thanks very much I yield back thanks sir thank you and now recognized resemble a Pinsky for five minutes Thank You mr. chairman sitting here in front of the family of a victim of one the crashes of a 737 max and looking at the pictures of the victims it's crystal clear that the with the responsibility of the FAA the NTSB and our committee is right now we need to get to the bottom of what happened so we can do whatever we can to ensure the safety of air passengers and from what we know so far it seems to me at least although there sounds like there may be have been other factors but it seems that something went wrong with the FAA s safety certification of the 737 max in 346 people died we need to figure out what went wrong if it was a certification process itself we need to fix it to avoid or repeat it was the problems the lack of compliance with the process and we have to hold accountable whoever it was that was not compliant the FAA and or Boeing in addition further steps must be taken to ensure compliance now where this is not a legal proceeding here and I know that we're in the early stages of the investigation of the crashes and the certification of the max but stories we've heard about the process of certification so far are troubling the guiding principle of the FAA and manufacturers must be safety not getting a highly valued plane out more quickly a question was raised earlier by chairman de Fazio about why the 737 max was not required to get its own type certificate to me this is very troubling seems to me that because it did have to get its own type certificate it could move more quickly through the process now I'm not a pilot and I'll defer to the pilots on this committee when it comes to issues of their experience as pilots but I am a mechanical engineer I know that this plane Boeing needed to compete with Airbus they in order to have a more fuel-efficient planes they put new engines on the plane the engines had to be put further forward on the wings these changes in aerodynamics caused the need for the mcat system and it seems to me that the MKS system fundamentally changes the way the Boeing 737 flies how is this not a major change that required a new type certificate well thank you for that question mr. Lipinsky and I'm I'm I'm glad you asked it because and I appreciate that you're an engineer actually the MKS was put into the 737 max for the opposite reason it doesn't make it flight differently the MKS was put designed into the airplane to make it fly and feel for the pilots exactly like the ng yes but it was it was a it was a change it was a fundamental change was how how it flies I understand was put in there to try to make it fly the same way but the system itself was a change so the MKS was added to a system that was on the that is on the ng called the speed trim system it is and I'm not an engineer but it is a layer below a software layer below the speed trim system and as you said the M cast was put in because the engines were brought the CG a little bit forward on the airplane the test flights demonstrated that in a high angle of attack regime the yoke didn't feel the same to the pilots as the ng the M cast pushed the nose over so that controllability and the feel in the yoke would be the same and the flight test pilots deemed that it was identical and then the flight sanitization board pilots which were actually lying pilots that we enlisted to fly both planes found came to the same conclusion well I am hopeful that this was not a situation where the desire was just to get the plane out more quickly that it wasn't a situation where safety was not the priority because that must be the priority as I said for the FAA for the manufacturer safety must be the priority I understand how important Boeing is is an American company but safety must always come first so right back I couldn't agree more thank you sir represent Spano for five minutes Thank You mr. chairman and as before I begin I I too want to extend my sincere condolences and regrets the members of the family we're here today can't imagine what you're going through and thank you for being here very grateful that you're here my first question is to mr. Elwell can you help me understand describe a little and more in a little bit more detail the FAs delegation authority what are the things we delegate what are the things that we don't delegate those things that we do delegate how does the FAA oversee the actions of designee 'he's just general thank you thank you sir for that question the key word in your question detail begs that after I introduce it I'm like to hand off the detail of the ODA to Earl who is our resident expert I will just start by saying the organizational designation Authority as it's come to be known Oda is a long-standing principle and certification and it is a way in which the FAA leverages the expertise within the manufacturing entity it's very important we understand that without leveraging their engineering expertise it would be virtually impossible to have the system that we have today so as far as the details of of how the ODA is administered Earl I appreciate that and I appreciate it's a long-standing process but the I think the public would like to know so that they can have some level of confidence that the FAA is doing the job we expect them to do what is delegated what is not how do we oversee that so thank you for the question because I think there is a lot of misunderstanding of our delegation process I like to simplify our cert process in four key areas and the first and foremost is setting the standards what are the rules and requirements for any design to meet next or another layer of test protocols and standing and standard so it's how you're going to show compliance the third level is the actual doing of the tests and the calculations and then the fourth is the overview of all those results and the approval only in that third level the actual doing of a test is where delegation is used FAA is fully responsible for setting the standards that all tests must comply with and setting the standards for the minimum safety for that aircraft and then reviewing it all in the end we never give up that authority we take advantage of the expertise of the people who are actually building and designing the aircraft to assist us and reviewing those tests and those procedures particularly on things that have been done over and over and over again over many years I want to highlight that it took us five years and over a hundred and ten thousand man-hours to certify the 737 max I don't think that was a quick process or just cursory review we apply the same rigorous standards on whether it's a derivative design or original design and I'm proud of my team for their abilities and their expertise and reviewing any certification project thank you thank you miss Lawrence on the next question is for chairman Tom wall if you would just help us help me understand last maybe two or three decades you know what what's the state of commercial airline safety here in the United States give us if you would a brief sketch in a minute in 12 seconds well I I think generally speaking the state of the airline industry in the in the United States over the last few decades has increasingly gotten safer and safer that as it was pointed out earlier we had one fatality in the past decade one is too many and of course we have the families of the Colgan 3407 crash here they there was 50 lives lost there so it's it's good but good is not good enough and then one final question it's been mentioned that we don't we can't control necessarily some of the the pilot training protocols abroad are there any mechanisms if any that we have at our disposal to ensure that other countries you know do have do require their pilots to have the training that we feel is appropriate and if so what are those mechanisms yes ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization outlines the standards and recommended practices for member states to follow there are a hundred and ninety three states that that are subscribers to signatories to to ICAO so and you can get us further information on that as well we're also reminded subcommittee that we've asked through a bipartisan letter to the do tig for the International pilot training standards and some other information as well we get that we'll share with the full committee recognize I represent Cohen for five minutes thank you sir Express my route it sadness at the loss of the individualism for the pair of the parents to be present here and all the relatives mr. Elwell I believe it was every country grounded the max before we did every country is it because they were too quick to draw a conclusion from two airplanes going down in similar circumstances and realizing the flying public should be protected in their countries or was it because we were just so much better at using data and not being concerned with the fact that there were two identical or closely to it close to identical crashes how will we last mr. Cohen as I mentioned earlier the FAA is data driven risk based systems approach we don't deviate from that because it's critically important that that's how we operate you mentioned we were the last as far as we know and we have talked to these countries who grounded their fleets we were the first country to ground because of a data that linked the two accidents which is critically important to us in Canada I must say Canada also waited till we had that data and the data was not available until the radar tracks were refined to suggest and and in evidence we found in the ground that linked the two flights so the opposite of data is common sense the other countries have acted on what looked like with common sense that there's a causal connection and a reason to think two airplanes fall out of the sky and they crash with similar problems with with keeping the plane under control after takeoff in high speeds and that's because you don't have the data yet you're jeopardizing another airplane it just seems like common sense should have taken control data is fine but sometimes it's just right before your eyes there was a story or article written that pilots of planes that didn't crash in the United States kept noticing the same basic pattern of behavior that is suspected to have been behind these two crashes this was in the Dallas Morning News review of voluntary aircraft incident reports the NASA database palace all safely disabled the MKS and kept their planes in the air but one of the pilots reported to the database that it was quote unconscionable that a manufacturer of the FAA and the airline's would have pilots flying an airplane without adequately training or even providing available resources of sufficient documentation to understand the highly complex systems that differentiate this aircraft from prior models mr. oh how can it be that we didn't tell the pilots about M casts and implore them to be aware of it in the situation this was the system that was put in to allow there to be a home what was it arguably a new airplane to compete with Airbus and we didn't tell the pilots so mr. Cohen the reports that you're referring to they're called a SRS it's a reporting a indemnified safety reporting system there were in the 50,000 flights in the max we had 24 reports that mentioned from pilots that mentioned some sort of anomaly on pitch none of those reports were related to the MKS zero and so and as I as I mentioned we scanned and filtered every one of those flights for evidence that there was M casts or aoa vein anomalies in the US fleet that is what FAA needs to do that's what we did there were no reports of MKS anomalies reported on on the max as the fa considered requiring that pilots that fly the max get simulator training I'm sorry do you mean in the future that anybody that flies a 737 max that there be a simulator and that they be trained in that simulator so we need to wait for the the Boeing application of the fix once we have the official application of the fix we'll be able to determine if and exactly what sort of training will be for max pilots and one last question media reports indicated that Boeing it underestimated the capability of them cast by a magnitude of four times and its initial submission of the FAA and the FAA only found about about if from Boeing's notice to Airlines explaining MKS after the lion air accident for the record can you please confirm this account and if that's not correct please clarify the time alone oh I'll get an answer for you on that question sir I'm not familiar with with okay we'll put it our rig took it for the record I yield back the balance of my time chair recognizes represent ball derson for five minutes Thank You mr. chairman and I also would like to express my condolences to the families that are here and my thoughts and prayers are with you administrator Elwell thank you for being here today in this important hearing there are currently 79 aircraft certification service OTAs are you aware of any International Civil Aviation Organization standards or recommended practices that directly conflict with the FF faa use of the organization delegation authorization program sir I'm not aware of any I will tell you that Oda is a practice shared by all countries who do certification and in some countries they use it much more than we do but please if you'd let me defer to to my colleague girl on that's just specificity of your question so delegation is used in universally throughout the certification process and in all countries and I guess I would would highlight that the 737 max was a dual certification in this case with easá the European safety organization and the FAA and so all the decisions and review of the delegation and those activities was conducted by both of the both agencies at the same time so I think that shows the reinforcement and the comfortableness of another authority in how we use delegation to assist us thank you very much administrator Elwell you state that any party the FAA regulates remains responsible for compliance with the eff FAS FAS regulatory standards in the FAA does not hesitate to take enforcement action when it is warranted can you provide examples of when faa enforcement action has taken as a result of non-compliance and how the faa was able to discover violations of your regulatory standards so there are examples when we have had to take enforcement action in particular there have been several actions taken with Oda I think and Earl will correct me if I'm wrong I believe that we have denied Oda authority as sort of a certificate for Oda and at least one occasion and then within the Oda organisations our oversight will occasionally discover somebody not following you have to understand that the organisation itself is run by a manual that is written specifically for the activities that the Oda is allowed to do and when that manual is not followed then you know will the oversight catch that will step in but Earl is there amplification on that just to build a little bit on mr. Elwell comments there we have removed one Oda but there are multiple findings as we say it we audit every single one of these entities on a annual basis and per the direction of this committee in our reauthorization bill you've asked us to stand up a new Oda oversight office and mr. Elwell signed off on on setting that office up in April and that will change us to not just waiting for an annual basis that will transition us to a constant overview of data flow so we'll be constantly monitoring and not just relying on on it so it will reinforce that eat to an even greater extent our oversight all right thank you both very much I yield back my remaining time mr. chairman thank you represent bothersome wheel with Jarek dancers represent Titus for five minutes Thank You mr. chairman I represent Las Vegas and about half of the 42 million people come on by plane and so having highest safety standards is very important when this first happened though I fly back and forth on Southwest every weekend first thing I did was called to see if the flight I had scheduled was one of these that was in question and I realized if I'm scared to fly on that I don't want my family my friends my constituents or my visitors to fly on that plane too so it's very important that we get to the bottom of this so I thank the chairman for having this hearing we've heard a lot of defense from you this morning about OD aids and the emphasis on data being the reason you grounded the plane and and that all sounds fine but the public perception was that it took so long for us to do it we were the last ones to do it it was because the FAA was just too cozy with Boeing that you were in bed with those that you were supposed to be regulating and that's why it took so long so that's the impression the public has on what we need to deal with now the emphasis shifts from not the grounding but the ungrounded so I would ask you what process you're going to use to unground at this plane I know you've created some new organizations within the agency I think on the second mr. Elwell you announced the formation of the joint Authority's technical review team – that includes a number of representatives from other countries – including Ethiopian Indonesia to investigate your certification process last week you announced a multi-agency technical advisory board to review the proposed software fix these don't have regulatory authority but I wonder are you going to use their decisions before you move to ungrounded are you going to have their consensus what's it going to look like to the public if you ignore them and just become window dressing would you address now the next step thank you ma'am thank you for that question because it's very important we have established the safety record that we have by doing just what you alluded to listening getting feedback getting suggestions we've been incredibly transparent throughout the process and and that's what we are with all of the countries we deal with with the stakeholders in the aviation industry the tab that you mentioned and described perfectly in the jet or the tab by the way as I mentioned earlier chairman DeFazio recommended that over over a month ago and we agreed wholeheartedly and we will listen in fact they're in there reviewing right now we've already received I believe a couple of a couple of suggestions we're also on as I mentioned in my opening remarks were going on May 23rd to meet with we invited 57 countries that grounded the max and invited their Civil Aviation Authority directors to come and talk to us and us to them more importantly explaining to them exactly the process our safety analysis we will not allow the 737 max to fly in the u.s. until it is absolutely safe to do so and we will use every tool every data gathering capability we have to ensure that's the case you have that as a personal commitment and as a commitment of 45,000 passionate aviation professionals in the FAA and what role will Boeing play in this process so Boeing will submit their application for the update to the MKS software the formal and final submission we expect I don't know early next week or so or and at that point we'll we'll do test flights we'll do analysis we'll present it to the tab the tab we'll look it over we will do a thorough and robust safety analysis we will determine based on the soft we're fixed they give us will determine what level of training will be required of 77 max pilots and then once we have established all of that and internally the fa review says that the 737 max is safe to fly then the prohibit the prohibition order will be lifted and we will present whatever mandates are are tied to this new software and you believe you have the resources and the expertise without depending on the OTAs to provide that final oversight and make that guarantee that it's safe to fly again yes ma'am I do and how do you reassure us on that and the pavement III point to an organization the faa z' diligence in safety that has produced a record that is in many ways remarkable in the u.s. I also point as I as I just said the FAA I've never seen outside of chairman Zumwalt's organization a more dedicated organization of safety professionals I'm awed every day I come to work they are amazing and I'll tell you they are I'm a little bit worried about morale right now to be honest with you across the FAA it is critically important to me that we and of course to the world into the u.s. that we get this right but it's important for public confidence like as you said and it's important for the morale of the of the great professionals that are doing the work to get this airplane safely back in the air and we're not going to do it till it's safe thank you thank you miss Joan thank you some titus I recognize of Massey for five minutes Thank You mr. chairman I'd like to widen our focus here a little bit and talk about the types of data we collect flight data how we collect it what we do with it after its collect not just in these particular incidents but other incidents because I find it odd that two weeks 30 days after the incident there's still speculation and guessing about what the pilots did how did they react and we don't know probably just about everybody in this room has a camera in their pocket and earlier in this hearing we saw a picture of a 1967 flight deck of a 737 and versus a 2017 flight deck of a 737 max and I understand why in 1967 there weren't cameras in the cockpit can you speak to why we don't have cameras in the cockpit cameras that are cheap and would answer so many of these questions we're still speculating about it seems mr. sim Walt please thank you very much for that question the NTSB has in fact recommended that I'm talking about for commercial flights of course that's right cockpit image recorders should be required for commercial flights we have four one for airline flights we have made that recommendation and it has not been acted upon white way hasn't have been acted upon well that's a great question and it's a question that the regulator should should answer can I ask you mr. Elwell do you have a thought on that so the FAA works with our colleagues at the NTSB very closely and we take every recommendation the NTSB makes and we examine it and we evaluate it for safety of flight and that is our first and foremost consideration and chairman some wellthe and I have not always disagreed on all the recommendations but I think we would both say that the this semi symbiotic relationship that we have has been part and parcel of where we are today and the safety record we have today let me ask about the the way we collect the data can you explain to my constituents why for $10 they can get internet on a flight for the whole flight yet we're chasing down a physical black box to find out what happened in the cockpit why do we have to go to the crash site to recover the data in this day and age and why is all the data lost if we can't find the black box miss mr. sim Walt or miss Schulz if you'd like to ask answer sir thank you for that question I'm not advocating getting rid of the black box I'm saying why can't we augment it with some streaming sure and I think the industry has been looking at this from a technical standpoint to understand what is technically feasible but I think that is something that would be an important backup to the equipment on the aircraft which is still a valuable tool and in these accidents extremely valuable for us to understand what was going on in the on the aircraft and in the cockpit it's hard for me to explain to my constituents who get on the plane and get internet why it's not technically feasible now I know why it wouldn't work in every situation but and why you need the black box but let me go to my third question which is what do we do with the data after we retrieve it mr. sim Walt why doesn't the NTSB publish all data from black from the black box immediately upon retrieval well thank you very much we do eventually publish that and let me point out that the NTSB used as a party system so when we have the data the manufacturer has it they shared with the manufacturer with the FAA with anybody who needs it to be able to understand the circumstances of that crash so that they can make immediate safe let me let me just appreciate your answer but I said immediately and you said eventually okay if we're talking about public release of the information yes that does become available when we open the public docket what why not make it immediate what what benefit is conveyed upon society by withholding that data from the manufacturer the person who actually made the equipment and why aren't they allowed to have it immediately and why is the NTSB allowed to withhold or block them from getting that data when and I wanted I'm talking about the difference between immediately and eventually because lives could be lost eventually all right let me make an important clarification the manufacturer and the FAA has access to that information immediately when we have it they are part of our party process they are in the room reviewing the data immediately with us I'm glad to have your assurance on that I have some manufacturers that have experienced different results Thank You mr. chairman thank you recognized represent of Stanton for five minutes a very much mr. chairman we're here today because of the unspeakable loss of 346 lives in the tragic crash of Lion Air flight 6:10 easy-open flight 302 our aviation system is the safe in the world but these accidents have shaken the public's confidence and Trust we owe it to the people whose lives are lost and their families to get to the bottom of what happened and address any issues within the FAA certification process to ensure the safety of not only this aircraft but the system as a whole the Mac should not be returned to service until the safety of the aircraft is assured by FAA Boeing itzhak and its operators back-to-back crashes demand the reviews of Boeing nFA's responses that are underway we need to get to the bottom of why a single point of failure was permitted in the max commercial aviation especially in the United States is so safe in large part because of safety redundancies based on preliminary reports a single point of failure appears to have played a significant role in these tragedies now they're going to reports of certain optional safety features of the Macs were sold as extras my question is for mr. Elwell is it common to have safety features offered as optional and not mandatory mr. Stanton any safety critical component to the certification of an aircraft is not optional it's part of the certification of the aircraft those features which are not an either the lion heir or Ethiopian Plains have made a difference in aiding the pylons to more quickly identify the MKS system was triggering in my opinion no I think you're referring to the AOA disagree light yes sir should these should these be required features I actually would like to defer to mr. Lawrence please so AOA disagree indicator has was not on the original 737 it was first introduced on the ng model it is a maintenance alert so we do not consider it part of our critical items and you know not aware of which aircraft mayor a craft may or may not have it installed as far as you know what are Boeing's plans to incorporate these features on all Boeing aircraft are they looking to incorporate the AOA indicator and all Boeing aircraft yes they it is not my understanding as it is not on other Boeing a aircraft it was just the ng and in the manner that it was displayed I understand that's the software modifications for the MKS system are in process can you describe the status of the modifications you would expect for the Macs and then how confident are you that these will reduce another incident involving a runway stabilizer trim event please let al let Earl modify or get into more detail on the answer but we are expecting the formal application of the mem castes update software update soon we do know the basic parameters of the three pieces to that fix that would in in once established and once put on airplanes would render the scenarios that that were perpetuated in the lion air and the Ethiopian accidents they wouldn't wouldn't happen the way they happened there but I'll let Earl elaborate any first lord I yes thank you um the software I would call it the beta version for this audience here has been submitted to us and the reason why they submit it to us is so we can stick it in the simulator so we can test it so we can also look at their system safety analysis and and see whether it will appropriately address it the key thing the new software does is look at both angle of attack indicators to assure that a single failure will not cause the system to initiate and future and future changes are one more question for mr. Elwell you're a US Air Force Academy graduate combat pilot during Operation Desert Storm commercial pilot for 16 years with a combined six thousand flight hours that's very impressive experience do you think the FAA should have mandated training for the mcat system for pilots knowing what we know now no so thank you for that question the investigations and the audits and the review is currently underway are going to make their recommendations I'm gonna answer you the way you asked the question as a pilot as somebody who has devoted my entire life to flying and safety I at the beginning when I first heard of this thought that the M casts should have been more adequately explained in the ops manual on the flight manual absolutely we in our emergency air worthiness directive that we issued on November 8th after lion air we added explanation of M casts and we also reminded our own operators in the world via document with kala Kanak we reminded pilots that when to engage runaway pitch trim procedures and we and we added a note to those instructions when we complete our overview when we complete our safety analysis I expect that we will have amplified and Cass description in addition to anything else that we think and we find is needed to make pilots more aware and and respond better to an anomaly thank you thank you thank you we're gonna proceed on our side of the aisle with questions and then if there's a member of the Republican Party that shows up that hasn't asked questions and they'll get in line and probably a time so we'll go with Nexus representative resident Craig recognized for five minutes Thank You mr. chairman I too want to express my sincere condolences to the members the family members are here today for the lives that were lost mr. Elwell as you may know before I came to Congress I worked similar in a similarly highly regulated space the medical device industry where one malfunctioning defibrillator or piece mater maker could result in an innocent life lost we heated strict compliance and reporting requirements to disclose after market malfunctions to the government through the FDA's adverse event reporting system this after market reporting was and continues to be justified with that in mind I'd like to learn more about the manufacturer aftermarket reporting requirements that allow the FAA to be notified about certain failures malfunctions or defects because according to media reports Boeing first discovered that the angle-of-attack sensor disagree light software was malfunctioning a few months after delivery of the Macs in May of 2017 at that time they learned the disagree light wouldn't work unless airlines also had the optional AOA indicators therefore 80% of pilots flying Boeing's Macs believed an indicator light would show when in fact it would not but it wasn't until lion air in October of 2018 over a year later that Boeing finally notified FAA that most planes were flying with software malfunctions furthermore the New York Times reported yesterday that pilots from American Airlines pressed Boeing executives to work urgently on a fix in a closed-door meeting they even argued that Boeing should push authorities to take an emergency measure that would likely result in the grounding of the Macs so with that I have three yes-or-no questions and then I have a fourth did Boeing have an obligation to report this after market software malfunction to the FAA Boeing software engineers did write a per a a PR what is the the performance report problem problem report ok followed there they followed their procedures because it is not that AOA disagree the light was not a critical safety display its advisory only for maintenance recording it languished and and I I am NOT happy with 13 months 13 month gap between finding that anomaly and us finding out about it and we're going to look into that we are looking into that and and we will make sure that software anomalies are reported more quickly so that was a yes did Boeing have an obligation to report this aftermarket software malfunction to existing airline customers for them to be aware of and submit a service difficulty report if necessary did Boeing have that responsibility yes or no I'm sorry can you repeat the question I didn't get the beginning did they have an obligation to report this aftermarket software malfunction to existing airline customers is there an obligation on their part to report this malfunction to consumers as well so the Boeing Oda and the Boeing software engineers respond to their procedures I'm going to defer to Earle on whether or not they that the standards and the and the OTA manual requires that the obligation is to be evaluate the anomaly to the internationally approved standards and procedures for looking at that you those procedures indicate that it's in the item that beats a certain level then yes it would have to be reported to the other airlines and to the FAA in this particular case the approved procedures designated the risk of this item not being in a working condition was did not require immediate action it did require action and that's what we were talking about we would like to see quicker reaction than 13 months and in the future and can you can you confirm mr. Elwell that boeing continued to deliver planes with a non-functioning disagree light even after the discovery that it was only operational with add-ons and even after the lion air accident I believe that the 77 max was delivered after the software engineers discovered that anomaly yes thank you and finally do you believe our current aftermarket reporting requirements are adequate to protect airline passengers I miss Craig we have an IG report we have the blue-ribbon panel of the special committee we have the chatter that we formed we have this committees investigation has been initiated and we're gathering reams and reams of data all of these reviews are going to look at the process top to bottom and come back with recommendations I fully expect that when this is all done we are going to have recommendations that will make us better in addition we're going to continue to scrutinize our process we're gonna make sure that it doesn't take 13 months to find out that there's a software anomaly but I I just want to remind everyone here let's not make the AOA disagree light the issue the a way disagree light is an advisory and the AOA disagree light would not have changed in either accident I want to make sure everybody understands don't don't make something that isn't a critical safety item a critical safety item because there are enough critical safety items for us to focus on thank you I yield back to noses represent David's the vice chair of the subcommittee for five minutes Thank You mr. chairman and I too would like to extend my condolences to the family members who have lost loved ones and are here today and I think it's really important for us to recognize that the relationship that exists between this committee and the FAA and the NTSB is one that is clearly geared toward making sure that we are operating the safest airline industry aerospace industry and and our Airways here in this country and I'm I've been very happy to hear the desire for just an evaluation of where are the things that we can actually address to make sure that no matter what these types of tragedies don't occur in the future and you know as a member of this this committee I take our constitutional duty of oversight very seriously and I know that you take FA A's duty to safety very seriously as well and because of that I want to take a step back and ask how often and you mentioned in your testimony that the regulations and safety certification procedures are constantly reevaluated can you talk a little bit about how often the process is really weighted to make sure that we're that when new technologies are coming along and and we've got new standards that might be developing how often are we evaluating the actual process of the certifications thank you for that question the FAA is an organization is constantly collecting data evaluating data taking action and reviewing it's the safety management system approach to everything we do it is never static having said that we don't changed just to change we we pull data we review we analyze data we do this both internally and we do it externally we have what's called an I don't I don't know how far you want me to go into this but we have an organization called the commercial aviation safety team that was formed in 1997 the goal there was to gather data from all stakeholders in the commercial aviation ecosystem and to collect all that data voluntarily and analyze that data come up with safety enhancements since 1997 we've generated over a hundred voluntary safety enhancements the entire industry uses and they use them to this day and we've reduced the commercial aviation fatality rate by 95 percent since 97 and that is exactly from what you just asked from analyzing our processes gathering data coming up with solutions implementing those solutions and then evaluating the results of that implementation and then can I'd actually like to hear about the the exchange of information between the NTSB and and FAA earlier you mentioned that when the NTSB has gone through and looked at some of the probably some of the previous accidents that at least on one occasion a recommendation to include video recordings and the cockpit has been made how often are the who's making the decision about which recommendations by the NTSB are being adopted into the safety protocols and can you talk a little bit about what that process looks like is that maybe maybe a little bit about how are the recommendations made and then how do you decide whether or not you're going to accept those recommendations right I'll make it quick the NTSB investigates transportation accidents and when we find areas that could could enhance safety as a result of that accident or crash we issue safety recommendations we issue them to the appropriate recipient we issue for aviation accidents more than likely they would go to the regulator who of course is the FAA in this case and we receive the NTSB recommendations and then we have to go through a process to evaluate those recommendations against the the whole system chairman some what we've had this conversation they have sometimes the Envia bill enviable luxury of looking at at a single event or a single issue we take every recommendation in its totality for the whole system and that's why we continue to collaborate and and we continue to evaluate all the recommendations for and for implement what for to determine whether or not they can be implemented but that the unifying thing between NTSB and FAA is an unshakable desire to improve this system and make the system safer sure recognizes represent Brownlee for five minutes Thank You mr. chairman I too want to express my condolences to the family who's here today my daughter lives in Africa and has lived and worked in Africa for the last five years she's lived in a couple of different places she lived in Nairobi and my daughter has taken this flight from Addis Ababa many many times so this particular crash really hit me hard and my gut but my condolences to you I also wanted to follow up on the camera in the cockpit cockpit suggestion so you make the suggestion to the regulator but none of those suggestions are made public that doesn't come to Congress thank you for that question we do not issue accommodations directly to Congress however when Congress asked for our input we do in fact provide a list of all all open recommendations and thankfully oftentimes those recommendations end up getting folded into legislation and then when the FAA doesn't agree with recommendations does that report come to Congress ma'am I don't think so I don't think so but I will check I'll check and make sure thank you mr. Elwell in your testimony you talked about you stated that any party that the FAA regulates remains responsible for compliance with the FAS regulatory standards and the FAA does not hesitate to take enforcement action when it is warranted so was there ever a time through the 737 max certification that enforcement was warranted the 737 max certification began in January 2012 and ended in March 17 so ever five years ever warranted two of the first Earl if we've if we took enforcement action specifically on anything with regard to the max um I do not believe we took any enforcement action regarding the max during that five years what would have happened because it was a certification activity as any time we would have gotten any concerns from any of the engineers that were working it we would have evaluated those and addressed them right then and there before the final certification okay but there in terms of some of this self certification process that's part of the certification process there was never a need to take any enforcement action um no yes or no I've got a lot of question up for these items okay very good also mr. Elwell in your testimony you say the FAA identifies all safety standards identifies all safety standards and makes all key decisions regarding certification of the aircraft so from your perspective does that ultimately mean that the the buck stops with you yes ma'am it does thank you also in the in your testimony you talked about the process for certification included 297 certification flight tests and you say then some of which encompass tests of the MCAS functions can you tell me how many times that that was tested you gave the number for the overall process but not for the EM cast as to 297 flights a hundred and thirty three we flew and the others we we contributed in some way or another Minoo the number of test flights where the M casts was evaluated that in a record somewhere we'd certainly would have that and get that back to you yes okay very good you also went on and your testimony to talk about secretary Chao and the US Department's inspector general report you have any idea when that report will be available to the public I think you're referring to the IG report directed on certification I can't I don't want to set a date for for the IG but I generally those investigations take 9 to 18 months Thank You secretary Chen also announced the establishment of a special committee to review the FAS procedures for certification you stated that that will be presented directly to the secretary and the FAA Administrator what about to the public into Congress typically this the special committee that will be formed under the sokak it is for lack of a better term a blue-ribbon panel in and in and in my experience over my career blue-ribbon panel results are often made public but I won't speak for the secretary as to how those results will be disseminated but I I can again get that answer for you absolutely thank you I have more questions back Cherokee noises remembers have already for five minutes I think keep stirred chairman and thanks to our panelists for being here I represent Dallas which is home to Southwest Airlines and American Airlines two of our best airlines here in the country who've also invested heavily in 737 max we also have Boeing in our area and I recognize the investment that they've made in this and the price that it's costing our Airlines the grounding of the Macs and also of course recognize what this is doing to Boeing but I think that our role on this committee and your role obviously as I know you agree that the FAA is that our our motivation for being here is that we want to make sure that our airspace is the safest in the world that we continue to be the gold standard I've been asked a lot about the Macs in Dallas and then I always say that you know we still are the gold center for safety and that we will remain that and so my questioning in these next couple minutes is getting at making sure we maintain that because when we spoke back in March when you briefed us in a private briefing I mentioned to you reports from pilots concerned with concerns of being raised about the Macs and you kind of downplayed some of those and then as the Dallas Morning News recently reported and as some of my colleagues have mentioned a recording between the American Airlines pilot Union and Boeing on November 27th 2018 the crowds expressed a number of concerns to the Boeing executives and my question to you is I was the FAA made aware by Boeing or by anyone else about that meeting or about any of the pilots concerns well thank you for that question mr. Allred my first indication of that meeting was was when I read about it in the article and I can't obviously I can't speak to a private meeting I will tell you this so my understanding is that meeting happened not long after the lion air accident and I will tell you as a lifelong pilot that when an accident happens anywhere and it's and it's it includes an airplane you fly it becomes this oh let's see it's a it's it's an emotional response pilot to fly an airplane when they see when go down and I would imagine that there was heightened emotions in that meeting I will tell you that when I was briefed and they explained the lion air and what we the data we gathered and told me about the EM Cass and I learned that it wasn't explained in the manual my my my my pilot juices started flowing and I said well we let's look at we need to look into that so I I don't I don't discount what what was reported in that meeting and I and I understand it but I can't comment on it what was said in the meeting okay do you know for there were any OD a designee is present at that meeting for Boeing I have I have no idea okay if not should there be a requirement placed on manufacturers like Boeing to disclose the concerns of pilots when they're presented in a fashion like that should the FAA have been made aware of that my so my initial reaction that question would be anytime a manufacturer that the FAA has regulatory oversight over becomes aware of a critical safety item it should be made known to the FAA and I'll defer to Earle if that's actually part of a regularly a regulatory requirement that if they become aware of anything that's critical to safety they need to disclose that to to us so after one crash when a major American airline major pilot union is expressing their concerns that should have been raised to FA I again if it is a critical safety of flight item either I was I would say just you know I'm not a pilot I would say though if we've hadded a crash and our professional pilots here domestically are expressing their concerns that that's something that the FAA should know about and so I think that that's something we need to look at here in Congress to make sure that you have that information as quick as possible if I could add mr. Olerud at the same at around that same time since the line air accident and forward to today my communications I happened to have been a allied pilot association member for 16 years I had regular conversations with the leadership of the Southwest Airline Pilots Association the Allied Pilots Association and the airline pilot Association on a regular basis because we thrive on transparency we thrive on communication and I had regular conversations with them including an April 12th meeting where we brought in the unions of all three of our us operators of the Macs and their flight departments and we had a give-and-take for about two and a half hours well thank you and just mr. chairman for the record if we could I'd like to have an answer on on the EM cast not being in the manual and how how the decision was reached by the FA not to require that if you could submit that for the record I'd appreciate that well the record so we'll proceed with the second round of questioning and I'll recognize myself for five minutes and go to mr. sim wall and miss Schultz with regards to the et 302 report as an example of how we work in a supporting manner and as opposed to lead are the things in the 83 302 report that you would characterize differently if you were writing it well I'll take a stamp of that and then let Dana mention it the Ethiopian government has not had the number of investigations that we've had and I say that not in a bragging manner but we've been in business for a long time they have not had many major accidents in Ethiopia so they don't have the level of experience that we do again I'm not bragging nor making a condescending statement it's just a fact as a result of that they are moving very cautiously and very deliberately and so as far as the rest of that I'll help defer to Dana thank you for the question chairman Larsen and in fact we're very pleased that the Ethiopian government did release a report publicly that information was critically important of course to the FAA and Boeing but it was also critically important to other airlines flying the aircraft and and frankly other regulators worldwide to understand all the factors with that said as with we see in many preliminary reports issued by different countries there perhaps not exactly as the NTSB would format the information or produce it but I would say that the preliminary report is just that it's the information that was available at the time and so I would caution that that's not everything by any stretch and some of that information will need to be expanded further and we are of course working very closely with the Ethiopian government to make sure that that we contribute as and participate in that work does ICAO provide a rubric for a standard format for the reporting for developing and for developing actually and for actually reporting the results of the investigation yes the the short answer to that is yes ICAO annex 13 outlines the standards and recommended practices and to your satisfaction in the case of ET 302 the Ethiopian government is following those standards and practices they are but Dana was just in Ethiopia last week and I think she could further elaborate yes they are following the annex 13 practice and we as a state are state of manufacturer have our accredited representative as part of the investigation along with our advisors and so I was in Addis to to meet with the investigative agency to reinforce the u.s. support and our participation in the follow-on investigation at this point that will go forward so yes they are following the process and we are going to continue to work closely with them on that in all areas so in the case of the lion air and Ethiopia well I guess when we apply our standard of timelines we tend to think it takes a year to get a final report out from NTSB about you better take the anticipate it'll be a year for a lion air report and a year from the crash for the ET 3:02 report yes in the case of lion air they have said that they would they're planning to get the report out by the 12-month anniversary as far as Ethiopian it's very early in in the stage for Ethiopia and I we couldn't say but the the Indonesian government is planning to have report released in towards the fall mr. Elwell regarding next week's meeting in next week in Dallas with the directors general what do you what do you what is the phase goal in this meeting thank you for that question sort of the the goal is to offer all of these countries who have grounded or prohibited flight in their airspace 737 max the benefit of all the information and all the thinking we as the state of design have to offer them it has been mentioned several times in this hearing that there is the perception at least of a crisis and confidence particularly with regard to the airplane and maybe may be larger it is my hope that we get to in a way sort of fix a process that didn't in my opinion go in a way that we're used to internationally on the initial at the accident internationally we are collaborative 99% of the time when the Ethiopian accident happened it was not a collaborative process from Sunday night to Wednesday morning despite our best efforts and attempts to have conversations I know countries act and they act for various reasons this on the on grounding I think it's just critically important that as a global community we do what we do best we collaborate we exhibit transparency we answer the questions that that I'm sure these countries are going to have of us and then at the end of the day and it will be literally a day long agenda and regimen with them my hope is that they have a confidence in our work in our analysis to make their on grounding decisions if if that's where the discussion is as close to our decision as possible because I think that's important for for the world to have some level of confidence thank you I didn't notice two members came in after we started a second round in fairness though I did promise the ranking side a set of questions unless they want to be kind enough to let us go to the members who came in for a first round I'm just saying together the rules are yeah okay okay all right well it recognized mr. DeFazio Thank You mr. chairman just an answer to an earlier question I did change the law a number of years ago and I think the mr. Zumwalt is aware of this you do have to respond when they submit things to you you can say yay or nay but you do have to meaningfully respond it used to be that you would send things over and they would never respond and ignore them so you should be getting gays or nays out of the FAA when you send things over yeah mr. chairman you're right and I I didn't realize that was the question but absolutely we are required to tell them that we're doing it or not doing it or why it used to be that they went into the ether now they have to least tell you that they don't agree in any case just to clarify that and and so to mr. Lawrence the as my understanding is originally the Europeans and the Brazilians said retraining of pilots was required later for whatever reason the Europeans decided it wasn't his that correct that's not my understanding of that okay what about the Brazilians again there would have lots of discussions and my understanding is so that list of forty or sixty things can't remember the exact number that that that the Brazilians had about the plane that they thought were significant differences doesn't exist I actually have a email here surf from the Brazilians that recalled that and said that was a mistake it was a mistake to say all those things that would require retraining and so then they just withdrew it III think the context of all of these things is these are discussions when we evaluate aircraft and right okay so so all right so all right fine but that's something that we're gonna be looking into and I've asked for both the Brazilians and the Europeans to respond because there's questions on why they changed their mind or when they change their mind or how they change their mind in this process now to the administrator so it's an amended type certificate because there's an artificial system the M casts which makes it fly like the earlier versions the ng and others now if we have essentially neutered the M casts all you have to do is pull on the oak does it now fly the same as all the earlier planes and so it's still an amended type or is it now a new type so mr. chairman actually in in the max pulling back the yoke doesn't it will in the future my understanding the fix no the fix won't include the yoke pull back cut out okay all right that that was they boarded and the staff was under that impression okay so but all right so M Cass is gonna be modified to work up all sensors that's the only major change except it will only trigger once correct and there's one more in and I I can and then the engineers can and imagine a scenario where this would happen but in the liner in Ethiopian incidents they MKS kept tree engaging because it still was receiving the signal that it needed to engage until it reached a point with the motion of the stabilizer this is – stabilizer the back of the airplane that pilots always have to do that but but it reached a point where they did not have yoke authority to reverse right I've the third part of the fix is no matter if it really just once and it would have to completely reset and go back to this to the proper it will always give the pilots one and a half G's of authority it would always give it will never go to full deflection so even in in the the chance that that it it powers several times the pilots will have yoke Authority okay just also for an earlier point you made about us leading the world and ICAO on on training standards I would point out that Congress had to mandate that change after Colgan air because I've been trying for many years and we hadn't gotten there and so that that was something that wasn't initiated and this was before your time by FAA was something that was mandated by the Congress Thank You mr. chair thank you after consulting the committee rules members get a first round and so we'll start with mr. carbajal from California Thank You mr. chair administrator how well in the last several years FAA has moved to utilization of Oda authority to speed up the certification process how does the agency determine whether or not it has enough inspectors or engineers to provide adequate oversight thank you for that question sir I would make a slight correction the organizational designation Authority Oda that you referenced actually wasn't put in place to speed up certification it was put in place so that a robust certification process could happen with collaboration between the FAA and the manufacturer of design and the detail about that is really in the wheelhouse of mr. Lawrence is the head of certification so I believe your question was about our oversight and how do we maintain that and the ratio there's multiple programs depending on the type of oversight whether it's manufacturing whether it's oversight of an air carrier or whether it's over the design and we evaluate that on an annual basis to make sure that we have sufficient resources to oversee those particular items and they're done individually and they are influenced by other factors such as a a company's financial status whether they're there's pilots on strike and you know we take all the external items not just their performance in consideration about what resources we have on their oversight that sounds very vague to me there's no standards that dictate the number of engineers or inspectors that you need to have on-site the standards don't articulate a ratio when it comes to eight ODA of a specific number of our resources to a specific number of their resources what the standards dictate is that we have the individuals necessary to do the over to do the oversight the reason why it's not a single oh one size fits all because of the different types of OTAs and the way they're structured when it comes to Boeing it is such a big one and it is so critical to us we established a specific Boeing oversight office that that is their sole job to provide that day in and day out so that their attention is not split in between oversight of another OTA or another manufacturer they are focused solely on making sure that the ODA and Boeing's performance meet our expectations thank you in October 2015 the Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General recommended that FAA adopt the new oversight approach for OTA holders by developing new evaluation criteria and risk-based tools the Inspector General recently testified that this report recommendation is still open what is the status of his effort and why has it taken it has it taken so long to do so sir thanks for that question we the FAA welcome the evaluation the audit the review that the IG offers that this committee offers every time somebody does a any entity within the FAA or externally we learn something new and we get better it's how we've reached the level of state that we have today and the recommendation you refer to 2015 recommendation about Oda oversight I'm gonna let Earl answer the specifics of that but what it has taken us is from a sort of a strict adherence to an annual review to something that is more akin to weight the way we do our oversight and the way we do our regulation in the system today which is much more data-driven risk-based performance-based so that we have their freedom to go and inspect an Oda five times in a year if we need to if the data suggests but I'll let Earl explain the specifics well I'll just add and the interest of time that we accepted every single one of those recommendations we've implemented them all except for one and it's not because we don't accept it it's just it takes a period of time to implement fully all those recommendations so we accept them all and we were grateful for those and they are guiding us going forward so how much longer is it going to take to implement this one so the last one is tied into implementation of direction from this committee as well to change the way we provide oversight to have a dedicated organizational delegation office that was designated by mr. Elwell in April and so that has started and it will take us at least the summer to restructure and get everything in place to implement that so I'm hoping by the end of this calendar year we will have completed that final recommendation as well thank you very much mr. chairman I yield back Thank You chair recognizes reps um Garcia for five minutes Thank You mr. chairman first I ask unanimous sent to enter into the record a statement written by the parents of Samia Rose Stu Moe who was just 24 years old when she was killed in the March 10th crash of a Boeing max a airplane while on a mission to help others with health care in low and middle income countries her parents as all of you know Nadia Miller son and her father Michael's two mo are tirelessly advocating for greater airline safety and of course they have joined us during the duration of the hearing today without objection so ordered Thank You mr. chairman um I waive my statement to ask questions as the hour is late as pratensis hearing mr. Elwell would you please confirm that proper operation of MK s was considered a critical or essential safety feature in your certification of Boeing 737 max aircraft yes sir the MKS was certified as a critical safety product in the total certification of the aircraft would the plane have been certified without it that's too subjective for me to answer I can't I can't give you an answer for the record on that mr. Laurence I'm I can maybe add a little context to it the MKS system was installed to be to make sure that it was in compliance with this specific regulation when handling characteristics so that was the method Boeing Chu chose to meet that requirement they would have to meet that requirement if they didn't do it through me I'm cast they would have had to meet that requirement so through some other means which could have been a structural change okay what review functions were delegated to Boeing's engineers and Boeing engineer managers serving as outside evaluators mr. l1 or either one of you sir could you repeat the beginning of that question what review functions were delegated to Boeing engineers and Boeing engineers slash managers serving as outside evaluators so I'm gonna defer to Earl on the specifics of that question so I believe sir you're referring to the organizational delegation members who are employees of Boeing and their oversight that's common and I make the distinction because Boeing the company not the ODA is responsible for compliance and must show all the compliance finding the members of the ODA and that structure which all members are approved and vetted by the FAA are the reviewers of whatever Boeing the company does first before we have our third set of eyes on what the work that they do am i answering your question sir I think so let me change gears as the clock is ticking in light of the apparent malfunctions of the MCAS in these crashes have you considered the adequacy of your review of the MCAS and any other essential critical safety equipment on the 737 max or other airplanes mr. Garcia thank you for that question sir that is exactly what we're doing it's it's what the the IG is going to look at as directed by the secretary the processes by which we certify aircraft the joint Authority tech review is going to look at the flight control computer system and the certification thereof and of course the special committee or the or the blue-ribbon panel that is been also commissioned by the secretary is going to look at the process that we used for certifying the M cast seven through seven max and our certification processes writ large again these are reviews and audits and investigations that because they have been helpful in making us better we welcome them and we will will participate to the extent that we're able and look forward to the recommendations thank you and to a chairman some Walt do you think that the outcome of the investigations that are ongoing will result in greater training of pilots from other countries congressman Garcia that's that's hard to say we need to figure out everything involved in each of these accidents to actually make that determination of course as you know ultimately the determination on on training will be up to the regulator thank you I yield back mr. chair thank you the chair recognizes represent Brown for five minutes Thank You mr. chairman earlier in the hearing chairman DeFazio was asking about you know who engineers report to engineers reporting managers a point was made that often these managers are engineers for me what that raises is really just the fundamental question of the Independence of the engineers who are making these decisions these assessments evaluations about compliance whether it's design or build out of these components or an aircraft the investigation around the Challenger shuttle explosion in 1986 found instances where engineers and employees raised concerns about the shuttle that were efficiently that were not efficiently taken into consideration by management and I know you know obviously NASA and FAA are different and the processes are different but my concern is that this could be another example of a management failure and not necessarily or exclusively an engineering failure sometimes managers are influenced by factors other than safety and quality and that's the nature of large organizations maybe it's profit maybe it's public pressure to deliver something so I'd like to ask about the mechanisms that are in place at the management level to ensure that engineering software and labor concerns are adequately taken into account when evaluating new and old products the FAA is responsible for ensuring that its products are brought to market all reasonable efforts have been made to properly characterize risk and ensure Public Safety is fully protected at the core of this function is the Independence of engineers who are conducting the evaluation so mr. Elwell what processes does the FAA have in place to maintain the independence of its engineering assessments for certifying flight worthiness and ensuring that there's an environment that engineers understand that their professional engineering opinion will be valued and supported thank you for that question mr. Brown that is exactly what we have endeavored to instill in the ODA process from its inception and and that is a freedom of the ODA members to come to the FAA with any and all in fact it's it's trained every Oda member is vetted by the FAA before that member is approved things such as integrity professionalism experience in certification all of those things are weighed we I would point out that not only has Oda been a refined process for decades it's also been endorsed by Congress in a number of FAA reauthorization z– that have actually expanded in statute our responsibilities to increase Oda and and I say that only to point out that Oda when done right is indispensable to the safety of the system and to the the health and growth of our aviation ecosystem having said that the investigations that have been initiated as a result of these accidents we're going to follow with great interest and we're going to take the recommendations and the findings to make this yes and I appreciate that in the course of valuating the safety of these 37 max during the certification were there any dissenting opinions raised during the evaluation of its flight worthiness and is this is the process set up where an engineer may disagree with another and raise that independently to the FAA your question did that happen did it happen something did it happen and does that happen I I don't I don't know if we have record of that in a row could you address that but I would I let all can you address that we do not have a specific record of a for example a written complaint from one of the Boeing engineers or concern but I want to reinforce that there's dialogue in between fa engineers and Boeing engineers along the whole process and they do express concerns they do have technical debates and that is a normal part of the process but and I want to highlight that the FAA sets the standards and the FAA is the final decision-maker and we do that to protect the engineers as you are articulating that they can't change the standards it'll be they evaluate to whether they're making those meeting those standards and when they see undue pressure there is a we actually require the Boeing OTA to have a whole reporting system which they have a process to evaluate any of those concerns and report a backup thank you thank you mr. chairman thank you continue with first round questions mr. Lynch Lynch is recognized for five minutes thank you very much Thank You mr. chairman for holding this hearing and I want to thank the witnesses for your help mr. Lawrence the the the issue around the sensors and and the fact that at least it is alleged in some of the press reports that that the purchasing airlines were not aware that certain sensors were in active have you dealt with that in terms of your own your own investigation and your own review of what has happened in both of these airline accidents so sir I believe you're referring to the angle-of-attack annunciator or indicator and the cockpit that was discovered by Boeing it was not reported to the airlines upon their discovery it was evaluated as an item under our software standards that did not have to be reported because there wasn't a associated pilot action with that indicator so since there was not an Associated pilot action to take based on that it was really there for a maintenance alert then they were not required they were required to update it and bring it back into working condition but they were not required to report it at that time so going back to the the bifurcation between the FAA s responsibility versus the responsibilities that we designate back to the manufacturer is that something that that if it were a a core FAA function would would have been made aware would have been that that information would have been made aware to the the airline's themselves or is that something that would have gone undiscovered regardless sir if there had been a if it to your to your question if it had been a critical safety of flight item it would have been immediately reported and would have been required to be immediately reported it took too long we don't need the IG investigation the Jat or the special committee to tell us that 13 months was too long for us to find out that there was a software anomaly and you have our commitment that we're going to look into that and fix that okay yeah as I read the organizational designation authorization this is the program where faa hands off responsibilities to to Boeing there there's definitely in my mind an asymmetry in technological ability that that boeing has here and I'm worried about regulatory capture if you will under the ODA it says that that only non-critical matters will be shifted to Boeing and when I hear the full committee chairmans say that this is a single point of failure in retrospect do you agree that that you know the the designation to Boeing for this responsibility should have been kept with the FAA thanks for that question mr. Lynch we are going to wait for the investigations on process for an analysis of there's three different studies right now engaged on the 737 max certification in general and OTAs yeah we we delegate to the manufacturer non-critical items so that we can focus on the safety critical or new and novel aspects of the certification of the aircraft okay I guess let me play my time I and I and I understand that and I fully respect that let me just go back and I know other members have said this already but this is a devastating devastating pair of accidents here and my heart and my prayers go out to all the victims and their families you also realize that this cannot happen again right this cannot happen again if if there if if we lose another aircraft and I'm I'm in a I'm in the city of Boston and so planes taking off and from Logan under these circumstances forty seconds out minute and forty seconds out would land in very densely settled neighborhoods and would be totally devastating so we have to get this right and I trust you'll do that thank you thank you or some of the Lynch will go to continue second rounds you know and start with representative Alderson thank you very much mr. chairman my first question is to both was witnesses in ISM on behalf of ranking member graves his question was how do US airline operations and safety programs differ from non-us airlines sir the each state is responsible for its own safety programs we have a set of standards set in guidance really but but but it adhered to internationally we have a hundred as chairman somewhat said earlier we have a hundred and ninety three nations participate in the International Civil Aviation Organization a UN body who adhere to those standards aviation standards across all aspects of the aviation ecosystem those minimums must be met or exceeded for any country to have fly to our country or to have a codeshare relationship with one of our carriers to fly to our country but it is up to each country to determine whether or not they're going to adhere to the minimums or raise them and in the u.s. clearly our standards for in almost every category of far exceed ICAO standards that's not to say that the ICAO standards in in any area are necessarily too low but we wouldn't have the safety record that we have in our country if we hadn't raised the bar and and the important thing here sir is we don't just raise the bar in in in our own little silo here in the US aviation we have been proactive internationally for decades and as chairman DeFazio mentioned one of the things that this committee that he championed which is upset training and stall training that was added to the training for our pilots in large part as a result of the Cogan incident we went to ICAO and we made the case and it was accepted at I killed that that additional training should be an international standard and we're now in the process of ensuring that that's implemented globally congressman the NTSB has nothing to add to what would actually administrator Elwell said thank you very much my next question is is – mr. Elwell there have been numerous reports in the media that the certification of the max was rushed how long did the certification of the max take sir the certification of the max began with the application in January 2012 and it ended and was and was certificated by former FAA Administrator Michael Huerta in March of 2017 the the whole process took five years just just around five years at the average for an amended type certificate somewhere between three and five so I certainly wouldn't characterize it as rushed we adhere to the principle that a certification is done when all of the standards and the regulations are complied with not a day before or day after and that's the criteria we use for the max okay thank you one follow-up do you know the typical amount of time a European Union Aviation Safety Agency certification takes sir I personally don't but but Earl are you do they have um I don't know what their averages but our Val on average projects that we've been involved on with some of theirs has been three years okay Thank You mr. chairman I yield back my remaining time all right chair recognizes a vice chair of the subcommittee represent of David's from Kansas for five minutes Thank You mr. chairman so I wanted to get into a little bit more about the distinction between the the light that the sensor will set off the I don't remember the differentiating the a away disagree lay disagree white so the disagree light is something separate and apart from the M cast system or the augmentation system actually engaging right so the light is has been the focus of and maybe it's the canary in the coalmine I don't know but I think the the bigger issue is if the system engages and pilots have to respond to it or are forced to respond to it the training and the notice that that might might be the case is seems where there there's a little bit of a disconnect or a concern of many members on the on the committee so what prompted the emergency air worthiness directive that was issued in November 2018 I know the lion air tragedy happened and then after that the emergency our air worthiness directive was issued and it's specifically called for operators of the 737 max to revise their flight manuals to reinforce and emphasize to flight crews how to recognize and respond to uncommanded stabilizer trim movement and M Casa vents what prompted that directive so thank you thank you for that question soon after the accident it was apparent the lion air accident was apparent that it was an EM Cass event and it's important to note that the M cast is designed so that if it engages when it is supposed to in other words in certain angles of attack it which means nose-high to the air stream and under certain conditions if it were to function it's designed such that the pilots would not even know that it's operating so by definition if it operates when it's not supposed to which is what happened in both of these cases pilots would immediately know that something maybe not the MKS and this is this is why it's very important an analogy I think that makes sense in this regard is if someone in a restaurant is choking you don't find out what they're choking on before you administer the Heimlich it's exactly the same and run away pitch trim when a pilot feels the nose going over in his hands he'll feel it in the yoke he's trained from the beginning at least it you as he was passing it's not to say that international or not that's runaway pitch trim and when the M casts kicked in when it wasn't supposed to it drove the nose over in in the pilots hands they could feel it so what when we looked at that data and realized by the flight data recorder showed that the runaway pitch trim procedure was not done with lion air and the in the entirety of the flight we knew that this needs to be emphasized and that's what the emergency ad did it said remember if you get a pitch over activity in an airplane and you didn't tell the airplane to do it that's runaway pitch trim run the runaway pitch trim procedure that's why we put in an emergency ad we also added and this this was important that before you run that procedure before you turn physically turn off those stabbed trim motors you still are able to use your the trim switch on the yoke trim the pressure off the yoke so that instead of feeling it pushing you over and pulling it back and fighting it trim off that pressure so the yoke is in a neutral state very important to do that before turning off those motors that was also in those instructions and that became critically important with the Ethiopian accident so what is the process to follow up on an emergency air worthiness if to ensure that the flight manuals and the reinforcement of the process that's supposed to be followed what's how do you make sure that once you've sent out the directive that it is actually being adhered to I'm gonna ask Earl to to watch me on this answer but when we the FAA issue an emergency ad and that and it applies to an aircraft that has worldwide use it is married up with a manufacturer's directive which in this case Boeing put out and it's also we do what's called the continuous air worthiness notice to international community a Kanak is also distributed globally pointing to the emergency ID once we do that then it is incumbent upon every Civil Aviation Authority that has is a state of registry for that aircraft that oversees their airlines their training to make sure that that manufacturer's bulletins and the FAA ad are adhered to Thank You mr. chair thank you just to have a few questions for wrap up first for some Walt how would you characterize the ongoing communications now between NTSB and and the Indonesian investigators and Ethiopian investigators very good and and of course Dana was in Ethiopia last week to ensure that we maintain those good relationships same with Indonesia Indonesia is very good as well alright mr. Hale well we talked about the tab that technical advisory board is it your intent that the FA would not make an decision to unground the 737 max unless tab recommendations were implemented mr. Chairman I it is my intent to have any tab recommendation dealt with and adjudicated ultimately the decision to on ground rests on me rests on the FAA I'm sole responsibility for it so I'm not gonna sit here today and put some responsibility on the tab that I shouldn't but the whole reason that we created the tab and that they're working with us and looking at the process right now is so that we can benefit from their expertise so before we wrap I want to give both of the witnesses a chance to add anything that they'd liked and I'd start with chair Simone well thank you I think we've heard questions about pilot training and maybe that there may be different standards throughout the world and I think it's important to point out that if an aircraft manufacturer is going to sell airplanes all across the globe then it's important that pilots who are operating those airplanes in those parts of the globe know how to operate them and I think that's important just to say that the u.s. standards are very good and this might be a problem with other parts of the globe I don't think that's that's part of the answer the the and I don't mean this I hate to use this term but the airplane has to be trained to the lowest common denominator Thank You mr. Elwell this chairman first I want to say again how sincerely aggrieved we all are the loss of lives in both of these accidents it's the reason why we do what we do is to prevent that so when it happens it's horrific and it drives us and if I could leave this committee in the American public with anything it is that the 45,000 professionals at the FAA and secretary Chao and this committee we are all united in the goal to make sure that we look at everything possible that's why all of these investigations these audits these reviews are so critic the important because we're gonna learn from them and we're going to honor the people who passed in these accidents and we're gonna make it better thank you no further questions from the subcommittee seeing none I want to thank each of our witnesses day for your testimony contribution to today's discussion has been informative and very helpful at asking names sent the record of today's hearing remain open until such time as our witnesses have provided answers to any questions that will be submitted to them in writing and unanimous consent in the record that the record remain open for 15 days for any additional comments and information submitted by members or witnesses to be included in the record of today's hearing without objection that is so ordered and if no other members have anything to add at the submit subcommittee stands adjourned you

13 thoughts on “Aviation Subcommittee Hearing: “Status of the Boeing 737 MAX””

  1. Mr. Elwell stated that the crisis of confidence “may be larger” than just as regards the Max aircraft. Yes, Mr. Elwell, I do not have confidence in you and, therefore, in the FAA as long as you have a position of responsibility in it.

  2. Mr. Elwell’s response to Ms. Craig’s first question is not acceptable. He stated that AoA disagreement was not critical. That may be true for the NG models, because in those models the AoA indicators do not affect the flight controls. But in the Max as initially designed, a faulty AoA indicator can cause the MCAS to send the aircraft into the ground! Of course it’s critical! The FAA should have known that from evaluation of the MCAS, and they certainly should recognize that today.

  3. Mr. Massie is dead wrong in suggesting that there is something wrong with getting data from recorders carried on the aircraft. The fact is that this the most reliable way to capture the data and it is exceedingly rare that the recorders are not recovered.

    Transmitting all the data through satellite links for all of the thousands of flights each day would be far more expensive, especially as the vast majority of the data would be of no interest whatsoever, and, more importantly, it would be vulnerable to loss from radio interference. So you would need physical recorders as backup anyway.

    What would be practical and useful would be periodic position reporting by radio with a transmitter that cannot easily be disabled during flight. Such a system would have helped locate MH370 so the recorders could have been recovered.

  4. Mr. Elwell’s explanation of his delay in grounding the Max is wholly inadequate. There was sufficient reason after the preliminary report of the Lion Air crash came out to believe that there could be something critical wrong with the Max. Elwell seems to demand solid evidence that there is some defect before making the decision to ground. That is not acceptable.

    Compare this situation to that of the Comet. When the Comet fell into the sea, the aircraft was grounded before they pulled the wreckage out of the water, merely on the presumption that there might have been something wrong with it.

  5. I think DeFazio is off on a couple of things here. The first is that while there may be 14 models, there are only four generations. Most model changes involve merely stretching the fuselage. The scond is that a new type certification requirement seems to be related to how the aircraft handles, and not to the implementation of the cockpit instrumentation. The latter can be learned without training in a simulator.

  6. Mr. Graves is completely wrong in saying that the artificial horizon is an angle-of-attack indication. That’s a shocking mistake coming from a ranking member of this committee.

  7. Now I understand from FAA that an AOA sensor together with a MCAS system that can put the plane to nose dive when malfunction is not considered critical. AOA sensors might not be considered critical on other planes. But how can the MAX 8 which has a system triggered by value obtained from the AOA can cause plane to nose dive is not considered critical.

  8. Boeing's incompetent management conspired to lie to the FAA and pilot community about the existence of a system which had the authority to override the pilots and drive the aircraft into the earth. This is CRIMINAL ACTIVITY. I am sure that Boeing will "fix" the software adequately, but that isn't my big concern. The main concern is that Boeing's management thought it prudent to conspire to lie about a critical system and they will do it again unless adults are hired to manage that company. The incompetence and recklessness on display here is staggering .

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